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ABSTRACT Radio frequency identification (RFID) is a modern approach to identify and track several assets
at once in a supply chain environment. In many RFID applications, tagged items are frequently transferred
from one owner to another. Thus, there is a need for secure ownership transfer (OT) protocols that can perform
the transfer while, at the same time, protect the privacy of owners. Several protocols have been proposed in
an attempt to fulfill this requirement. In this paper, we provide a comprehensive and systematic review of
the RFID OT protocols that appeared over the years of 2005–2018. In addition, we compare these protocols
based on the security goals which involve their support of OT properties and their resistance to attacks. From
the presented comparison, we draw attention to the open issues in this field and provide suggestions for the
direction that future research should follow. Furthermore, we suggest a set of guidelines to be considered in
the design of new protocols. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first comprehensive survey that reviews
the available OT protocols from the early start up to the current state of the art.
INDEX TERMS Authentication, delegation, EPC, ownership transfer, RFID, trusted third party.
I. INTRODUCTION
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) is a system that
employs radio waves to identify assets [1]. This system has
many features that allow it to outperform the traditional
identification systems such as barcodes [?]. This has led
to the widespread proliferation of RFID systems and their
deployment in several application environments [3].
Any RFID system consists of three main entities; the Radio
Frequency (RF) tag, the RF reader (interrogator), and the
back-end server (or database) [1]. Each asset in the supply
chain is embedded with an RF tag. The tag has an electronic
silicon chip that stores a unique identifier (ID) in its non-
volatile memory. This ID uniquely identifies the tag and its
associated assets. The reader has one or more antennas which
are used to send an RF signal to the surrounding tags to
interrogate them. Once the tags receive the RF signal, they
harvest power from it and respond by sending their IDs.
The back-end server stores the required information for all
items and tags in the system. Thus, when the reader gets the
ID information from one or more tags, it can identify the
corresponding item(s) by passing the ID(s) to the back-end
server.
The computation and storage capabilities of readers and
back-end servers are higher than those of tags. Thus,
they can perform strong cryptographic functions. Therefore,
the communication channels between readers and servers are
assumed to be secure and are treated as one entity. On the
other hand, the communication channels between any entity
and the tags are typically insecure and susceptible to security
threats.
Tags in RFID systems are classified into three categories
depending on the power source: active, semi-passive (or semi-
active), and passive tags. Active tags use on-board batteries to
activate the circuitry and to transmit data. The semi-passive
tags power up their circuitry using their own batteries yet
they harvest the power required for data transmission from
the incident RF signal. Passive tags do not have any power
source and depend solely on the received RF signal for
power harvesting. Therefore, in active tags the communica-
tion ranges are longer than passive tags and their computation
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levels are much better which makes them the most expensive
type.
In wireless networks, the coverage area between two end
points is unknown and uncontrollable and this causes vulner-
abilities at different levels for all wireless communications.
Thus, the security problems of general wireless communica-
tion are also present in RFID systems.
In addition to the problems of wireless communication,
RFID systems suffer from other inherent security issues. Any
reader (regardless of the holder’s identity) can interrogate the
tag which gives a chance to adversaries to collect confidential
information, insert harmful data into the tag, or even kill
the tag to disable it permanently. Moreover, since RFID tags
always respond with the same static ID whenever they are
queried, the tagged item can be tracked. This could expose of
the owner’s physical location.
Another point of concern is that passive tags have limited
power and computational capabilities. The number of avail-
able logic gates ranges from 5,000 to 10,000 gates of which
only 250-3000 can be utilized for security purposes [4]. Thus,
strong encryption techniques such as the Advanced Encryp-
tion Standard (AES) which needs approximately 3000 gates
and hash functions such as SHA-256 which require about
8000-10000 gates cannot be implemented on passive
RFID tags. According to the EPC Class-1 Generation-2
(EPC-C1G2) standard, passive tags can only perform 16-bit
Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) and 16-bit Pseudo Random
Number Generation (PRNG). In addition, they can execute
simple bitwise operations such as the XOR, AND, and OR.
Hence, developing security protocols for passive RFID sys-
tems is considered a difficult challenge.
Even if we disregard the scarcity of available gates to
implement the security protocol, the limited power available
for communication and computation is still an issue. Since
most of security protocols are performed in terms of several
sessions during a limited time period, it should be guaranteed
that the provided power is enough to fully complete the
protocol session. Otherwise, the protocol may be aborted
before completion, which can result in de-synchronization
problems.
The time required to execute the security protocol is
another challenge. Protocol message exchanges should be
performed in a short computation/communication time. For
example, in supply chain inventory, the tags are identified as
groups. Therefore, the employed security protocol should not
slow the identification process down.
As demonstrated by these challenges, designing a security
protocol for passive RFID system is not a simple task as there
is a trade off between the needed security and minimizing the
computational load.
A. EPC STANDARD
Several standards were proposed for RFID systems. One
of the well-known standards is the Electronic Product
Code (EPC). This standard has several classes; one of which
is the EPC-C1G2.
The EPC-C1G2 standard specifies the properties for tags
in the passive RFID system as follows:
• Tags are passive.
• The communication range of the tags is limited up
to 9 meters.
• Strong cryptographic techniques cannot be implemented
on tags as they are extremely constrained in the
resources and storage capacity.
• Each tag’s chip has on board circuitry for a 16-bit CRC
and 16-bit PRNG.
• In these tags, two passwords are stored. The first one
is the Access password which is issued when pro-
tected data need to be accessed. The second is the
Kill password which is used to permanently disable the
tag.
• Each tag has a unique identifier known as EPC that must
consist of 96 or 192 bits.
B. SECURITY GOALS FOR RFID SYSTEMS
Since RFID systems are susceptible to various threats, sev-
eral security protocols have been proposed to secure these
systems. In order to determine whether a protocol is secure,
it should satisfy the following requirements:
1) The security protocol should guarantee that any two
communicating entities are legitimate. Generally, this
requirement is known as mutual authentication and can
be achieved by ensuring that both parties share the same
secret information such as the nonces, keys, and hash
values.
If any of the communicating entities is malicious,
the consequences may be severe. For instance, a mali-
cious reader can acquire sensitive information by inter-
rogating an RFID-tagged credit card. On the other
hand, a merchant might approve a transaction that is
based on false data when dealing with a fake tagged
credit card.
2) RFID systems are constrained in power resources when
compared to other devices such as PCs and cellphones.
This fact makes the supported encryption methods in
RFID systems more susceptible to attacks such as
eavesdropping. Hence, while taking into account the
power limitation issue, the security protocol should
protect the privacy of RIFD systems by achieving the
following properties:
• Confidentiality: Sensitive information such as
passwords, keys, and tag data should be encrypted
to conceal them from adversaries.
• Integrity: The security protocol should protect the
exchanged data between legitimate entities from
modification. Moreover, it should provide a way
for the participating parties to verify the validity of
the received data.
• Untraceability: In some situations, the adver-
saries are interested in the location of the tagged
item rather than disclosing its secret informa-
tion. By tracking the tag’s responses (whether
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encrypted or not), an attacker may expose its
location.
To prevent tracking, the security protocol should
ensure that the tags always respond with fresh
data whenever interrogated. Randomizing the tag’s
response is generally performed by employing
PRNGs or true random number generators such
that each response includes a fresh nonce.
3) One last requirement is related to changing the owner
of the tagged item. Obviously, in these cases, the access
rights of the tag need to be transferred to the new owner
in a secure manner. The process of completely transfer-
ring the read andwrite privileges from a reader or group
of readers to another reader or group of readers is
known as the ownership transfer (OT). In different
scenarios, the access rights need to be transferred from
one owner to another (called delegate) for a specified
time period. For instance, the tagged item is to be
rented or to go under warranty maintenance. In this
case, the process of transferring the access privileges
is called ownership delegation (OD). OD is considered
a special case of the OT.
In contrast to OT, the current owner and the delegate
in OD share the access rights during the specified del-
egation period. However, once the need for delegation
no longer exists, the current owner revokes the access
rights of the delegate.
C. CONTRIBUTIONS
In this work, we survey the existing OT protocols that
have been proposed through the literature over the period
of 2005 - 2018. We analyze these protocols and highlight
their properties, advantages, and disadvantages. Moreover,
we compare between the proposed OT protocols based on
several characteristics and show the results in a tabular form.
We also provide a suggestion for the future direction of the
work in this field and examine the possible improvements on
the current state of the art. This is further supported by a set
of guidelines that would be useful for the future designs of
OT protocols.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Section II
we specify the security goals of the ownership transfer, give
an introduction to the ownership transfer protocols, present
our unified notations, and then demonstrate the idea of
ownership transfer through a general scenario. After that,
we present the TTP-based ownership transfer protocols in
Section III. Next, in Section IV we introduce the second cat-
egory of ownership transfer protocols, namely the Two-party
protocols. In Section V we go though the third class of
the protocols which are called the universal ownership trans-
fer protocols. Moreover, in Section VI we present the concept
of ownership delegation and further clarify the idea with
an example. After that, we compare the protocols from the
three categories in a tabular form based on their properties
and vulnerabilities to attacks in Section VII. We provide our
discussion and recommendations in Section VIII. We con-
clude our work in the conclusions Section IX.
II. OWNERSHIP TRANSFER
OT is the process in which the ownership of an RFID tagged
item is transferred from the current owner to a new one. OT
is considered an important aspect of RFID systems because
most of the time the tagged item will change owners at
least once. In OT, the secret information such as keys and
passwords will be exchanged by the owners and tags. This
may allow the adversaries to perform several attacks if not
carried out securely. Therefore, it is essential to guarantee
that OT is performed in a secure manner which protects the
privacy of both the current and new owners from violation by
each other or by adversaries.
A. SECURITY GOALS OF OWNERSHIP TRANSFER
Since OT is one of the needed requirements for secure RFID
systems, the properties that an OT protocol should satisfy
are classified into two aspects: properties for securing RFID
systems in general and properties for securing the OT process
in particular. Both aspects of properties are listed below.
General Properties of OT Protocol:
• Resistance to tag tracking: The protocol should prevent
the adversaries from tracking the tags’ location.
• Resistance to tag impersonation: The protocol should
guarantee that no fake tag can successfully pass the
authentication process with a legitimate server/reader.
• Resistance to server/reader impersonation: The protocol
should guarantee that no fake server/reader can success-
fully pass the authentication process with a legitimate
tag.
• Resistance to replay (or spoofing) attack: Assuming that
an adversary eavesdropped on the exchanged messages
between the server and the tag, the protocol should
ensure that the adversary cannot complete a successful
session with either the server/reader or the tag by replay-
ing the captured messages or a modified version of these
messages.
• Resistance to Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attack: The
protocol should prevent the adversaries from inserting
new messages or changing those originally exchanged.
• Resistance to De-synchronization attack: This attack
happens when the server/reader and the tag are forced
to change their states differently by interrupting the
message flow between them. This break in synchro-
nization leads them to have different secret values and
will no longer be able to communicate. Thus, an OT
protocol should ensure that the server/reader and the tag
are always synchronized, even if the message flow was
interrupted by the adversaries. It should be noted that
the de-synchronization attack is considered a type of
Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack.
• Resistance to disclosure attack: The protocol should
prevent adversaries from obtaining the sensitive infor-
mation held or exchanged by the participating parties.
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Specific Properties of OT Protocol:
• New owner privacy: The protocol should guarantee that
the old owner (the entity who previously owned the tag)
can no longer access or track the tag after successfully
completing the OT process.
• Old owner privacy: The protocol should guarantee that
the new owner cannot track the previous transactions
of the tag (i.e.; it should protect the privacy of the
old owner).
• Windowing problem: The protocol should ensure that
there is no time slot where the old and new owners can
simultaneously access the tag during the OT, otherwise
the protocol becomes a sharing protocol rather than an
OT one. The windowing problem should be prevented
during OT only. In OD, both the owner and the del-
egate should be able to access the tag simultaneously
so that the owner can terminate the delegation when
necessary.
• Exclusive OT: The protocol should prove that the new
owner has completely taken over the ownership from
the old owner (i.e. provide a proof for the exclusive
ownership of the new owner). Violating the new owner
privacy (which means that the new owner may not be
the only owner of the tag) would also mean violating the
exclusive OT property.
In addition to the previously mentioned properties, the OT
protocol should satisfy the following properties in order to be
considered a complete protocol
• Controlled delegation: The protocol should allow for
controlled delegation in addition to the complete transfer
of ownership. Controlled delegation indicates that the
delegate can access the tag for a predetermined number
of times or until the owner terminates the delegation.
• Authorization recovery: In certain situations, the proto-
col should allow the old owner to access the tag again
after its ownership has been transferred. For example,
when a tagged item needs to go under warranty main-
tenance, the retailer (i.e. old owner) should be able to
access the tag again to perform the maintenance. In the
meantime, the new owner is still the owner of the tag.
Thus, the same approach that is used to carry out the
controlled delegation can be used to perform the autho-
rization recovery (AR). In other words, AR is considered
a special case of the controlled delegation where the
delegate is a previous an old owner.
• Supporting Mobile Readers: In mobile RFID systems,
the readers and tags are not fixed and change their
location regularly [5]–[7]. Moreover, in these systems
the readers communicate with the back-end servers via
wireless networks [8]. In the literature, one can find
some OT protocols that support mobile readers. These
protocols take into consideration the characteristics of
the mobile RFID systems and are designed to perform
OT in them.
It must be mentioned that the new owner’s privacy
notion has been represented by other terms such as forward
untraceability, backward privacy, and forward security. All of
these denote the same meaning and can be used interchange-
ably. The same applies for the old owner privacy where it can
be replaced by other terms such as backward untraceability,
forward privacy, and backward security. The use of different
terminology in the literature is quite confusing when the
same terms refer to different things. As such, in this survey,
we solely use the terms new owner privacy and old owner
privacy; respectively, even if different terms were used in the
original papers.
In 2006, a survey on RFID security and privacy was pub-
lished by Juels [?]. In his survey, Juels discussed issues
related to general RFID systems, cryptography and possible
threats. At that time, OT was in its earliest stages and few
protocols were considered in the survey. The earliest OT
protocols that were reported in the literature are the pro-
tocols of Saito et al. [9] and Molnar et al. [10] in 2005.
After these two protocols, several works that aim to develop
OT protocols or analyze the existing ones were proposed.
In his thesis, Kapoor assessed some of the existing OT pro-
tocols in 2008 [11]. In the same year, the OT protocols
that were proposed around that time were briefly presented
in Langheinrich’s survey on RFID privacy approaches [12].
What appeared in both works is useful although a more thor-
ough and broader investigation of the literature that appeared
later is needed.
In this work, we present and analyze the OT protocols from
the earliest proposed ones up to the current state of the art. The
objective of this survey is to help in providing a thorough and
systematic understanding of the OT protocols by presenting a
classification for these protocols and discussing their advan-
tages and vulnerabilities.
The main focus of this survey is to discuss each proto-
col from the OT perspective only. However, in Table 10 in
Section VII we specify whether the protocol supports OD,
AR, or both.
B. OWNERSHIP TRANSFER PROTOCOLS
Several OT protocols were proposed to secure the OT process
in RFID systems. An entity is considered an owner of a
tag by exclusively sharing certain secrets with it. Therefore,
when the tag’s ownership is to be transferred to a new owner,
the shared secrets should be updated to new values that are
only known by the new owner and the tag. Generally speak-
ing, any OT protocol should involve at least the following
three steps:
1) The current owner (who eventually becomes the old
owner when the OT is completed) updates the shared
secrets with the tag to new values.
2) The current owner forwards the updated secrets to the
new owner via a secure channel.
3) The new owner employs the received secrets to gener-
ate new ones and then exchanges themwith the tag. The
exchange process between the new owner and the tag
should be performed securely without the intervention
of the current owner (i.e. old owner).
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FIGURE 1. Classification of OT protocols
Based on the reviewed literature, the proposed OT proto-
cols are classified into two main categories: protocols that are
based on the existence of a trusted third party (TTP-based OT
protocols) and protocols that depend only on the communi-
cation between the owners (Two-party OT protocols).
In TTP-based OT protocols, there exists a trusted third
party (TTP) in addition to the main entities of the RFID
system. The purpose of the TTP is to help in transferring the
tag’s ownership rights from the current owner(s) to the new
owner(s). Thus, in this class, the TTP supervises the exchange
of secret keys between the new owner(s) and the tag(s). It is
also responsible of confirming that the current owner has
completely released the tag’s ownership (in some situations
this can be carried out implicitly by updating the old keys) and
that the new owner has become the exclusive owner. In some
protocols, the back-end server carries out the role of the TTP.
On the other hand, in Two-party OT protocols there are
no TTPs and the current and new owners complete the OT
process by communicating directly with each other and with
the tag(s). Moreover, some protocols assume that there is
an isolated (i.e. secure) environment (ISE) where the new
owner(s) can exchange the secret keys with the tag(s) with no
interference from the old owner(s). Therefore, this category
is sometimes called ISE-Based.
Each of the two categories has its own supporters. Those
who develop their protocols based on the existence of a TTP
argue that it is necessary to rely on a TTP to secure the OT
process without using heavy cryptographic functions on the
tags. Otherwise, the computational and power cost would
be high. Moreover, they consider that the assumption of the
existence of an isolated environment in the Two-party proto-
cols is unreasonable because if there is such an environment,
there would be no need for a security protocol to encrypt the
exchanged keys and passwords.
The supporters of Two-party OT protocols point out that
there should be no centralized entity such as the TTP where
all sensitive information is stored in a single location. Because
compromising the centralized entity would allow the adver-
saries to perform all sorts of attacks. In addition, they argue
that the new owner can find an isolated environment to com-
plete the OT process. Thus, an OT protocol can be imple-
mented without using heavy cryptographic functions.
The TTP-based and Two-party OT protocols can be fur-
ther classified into either protocols that perform either single
transfer or protocols that perform group transfer. In sin-
gle transfer, the ownership of only one tag is transferred
from one current owner to one new owner (i.e. single-tag to
single-owner relation). On the other hand, in group trans-
fer the protocol simultaneously transfers the ownership of a
group of tags from a single current owner to a single new
owner, transfers the ownership of a single tag from a group
of current owners to a group of new owners, or transfers
the ownership of a group of tags from a group of current
owners to a group of new owners (i.e. multi-tag to single-
owner, single-tag to multi-owner, or multi-tag to multi-owner
relation).
The classification of OT protocols is shown in Fig. 1.
C. NOTATION
One issue to consider at the beginning of surveying the litera-
ture is the non-consistent notation and operations used in dif-
ferent papers. To better present the ideas of the protocols and
to explain all protocols with the same terminology, we adopt
a unified representation of the notation and operations.
The unified notation and operations used in this work are
given in Table 1 and Table 2.
D. GENERAL SCENARIO OF OWNERSHIP TRANSFER
In 2005, Saito et al. proposed one of the earliest OT protocols
in the literature [9]. In this section, we cover this protocol
in order to lay the foundation and demonstrate the main
concepts of OT protocols and the threats that they may face.
Saito et al. proposed two OT protocols, one of which is
TTP-based. We start by covering the TTP-based protocol,
shown in Fig. 2.
In the TTP-based protocol, four entities are involved: the
TTP, current owner (Rc), new owner (Rn), and tag (T ). The
authors assumed that the communication between the owners
is secure as well as that between the owners and the TTP.
In this protocol, Rc who currently owns T , will transfer its
ownership to Rn with the assistance of the TTP. T shares
with Rc the secret key KRc,T , and with the TTP the secret key
KTTP,T . Rc initiates the OT by sending message M1 which
holds KRc,T to Rn through a secure channel. Upon receiving
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TABLE 1. Unified notation used in this work.
M1, Rn randomly generates a new key KRn and then it sends
it, using message M2, along with the received M1 to the TTP
via a secure channel. The TTP, in turn, encrypts the received
messages by computing messageM3 = EKTTP,T (M1‖M2) and
sends it to Rn which in turn forwards the message to T . Once
T receives M3, it decrypts it by computing DKTTP,T (M1‖M2)
in order to obtain M1 which holds KRc,T and M2 which
holds KRn . After that, T checks whether the extracted KRc,T
matches the stored one and if both values match, it veri-
fies the legitimacy of the received message and updates its
TABLE 2. Unified operations used in this work.
key to the extracted KRn and by that Rn becomes the new
owner.
At first sight, one may assume that this protocol satisfies
the requirements of a secure OT since the new owner has
safely shared its key with the tag and the old owner can no
longer access the tag or track the new owner’s transactions
with it. Thus, Saito et al.’s TTP-based protocol achieves new
owner privacy.
However, this protocol violates the old owner privacy
because the old owner shares its secret key with the new
owner. Therefore, using the old owner’s key, the new owner
can decrypt all previous transactions between the old owner
and the tag.
Moreover, the tag does not send an acknowledgment to
indicate that it has updated its key and this can lead to
de-synchronization problems. If the last message sent from
the new owner to the tag is blocked, the tag will not update
its key. On the other hand, the new owner assumes that it has
become the owner of the tag and so does the TTP. Hence,
the new owner will not be able to communicate with the tag
as it still uses the old key.
This protocol is not suitable for low-cost tags as it uses
a symmetric key cryptographic function, which is not sup-
ported as indicated by the EPC-C1G2 standard. Furthermore,
Saito et al.’s protocol does not performmutual authentication
between the participating entities before issuing the OT.
Finally, in this protocol, the tag stores the secret keyKTTP,T
that is shared with the TTP. If this key is exposed by an
Adv, it can compromise the whole system. Using KTTP,T
and messages M1 and M2 which contain the old and new
keys; respectively,Adv can decrypt all previous and upcoming
transactions in the system. In addition, it can forge its own
tags and lead the TTP to authenticate them as legitimate tags.
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FIGURE 2. Saito et al.’s TTP-based protocol
As can be seen from this quick analysis, Saito et al.’s TTP-
based protocol suffers from several vulnerabilities whichmay
threaten the privacy and security of the involved entities.
Next, we consider the second protocol in the work of
Saito et al., which does not involve a TTP and is only based
on the communication between the current and new owners.
In this protocol, three entities are involved; current owner Rc,
new owner Rn and T , as shown in Fig. 3.
OT is started by Rc which securely sends messageM1 to Rn
through the secure channel.Rn, in turn, transmits a query to T ,
which responds by generating a random nonce NT and sends
it as message M2. When Rn receives M2, it generates a new
key KRn and then computes message M3 = EM2 (M1‖KRn )
and sends it to T . At last, T decrypts the received message
to obtain KRc,T and KRn and if the received KRc,T is verified,
T updates its key to KRn .
The secondOT protocol suffers from a serious shortcoming
in addition to the previously mentioned ones. In this protocol,
message M2 which holds NT is used by the new owner to
encrypt its and the old owner keys. Since M2 is transmitted
in plaintext, any entity that captures this message can decrypt
message M3, which hides the owner’s keys and this violates
their privacy. In other words, if the old owner captures M2,
it can obtain the new owner’s key. Thus, Saito’s second
protocol breaches the new owner privacy.
In the following sections, we provide an overview of the
OT protocols based on the taxonomy given in Fig. 1.
III. TTP-BASED OWNERSHIP TRANSFER PROTOCOLS
In this section, we cover the TTP-based protocols present in
the literature. We start by demonstrating the single transfer
protocols and then go to the group transfer.
A. TTP-BASED SINGLE OWNERSHIP
TRANSFER PROTOCOLS
TTP-based Single OT protocols are classified into two cate-
gories; namely EPC-compliant and non-EPC-compliant. The
EPC-compliant protocols adhere to the EPC-C1G2 standard
which was previously discussed in I-A. Mainly, the computa-
tional capabilities of the tags in the passive RFID systems are
limited to simple bitwise operations, 16-bit PRNG, and 16-bit
CRC functions only. Furthermore, the standard states that the
tag ID should be of 96-bit length and that any tag must store
two passwords; the KILL and ACCESS passwords. On the
other hand, non-EPC-compliant protocols break at least one
of the rules specified by the standard. In this section, we first
explain the EPC-compliant protocols and then move to the
non-EPC-compliant protocols. For each protocol, we start
with a brief description of its procedure and then discuss its
vulnerabilities.
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FIGURE 3. Saito et al.’s Two-Party protocol
1) EPC-COMPLIANT TTP-BASED SINGLE OWNERSHIP
TRANSFER PROTOCOLS
We start with Lim and Kwon’s protocol which emphasizes
that an OT protocol should achieve new owner privacy in
addition to the old owner privacy before and after the tag
is compromised [13]. The main operations employed in
this protocol are bitwise operations, random number gener-
ators (RNG), and pseudorandom functions that are imple-
mented from a single lightweight block cipher. To achieve
new owner privacy in their protocol, Lim and Kwon perform
mutual authentication between the TTP (represented as the
back-end server (BS) in the protocol) and T before OT takes
place.
Fig. 4 shows the messages that are exchanged to mutually
authenticate TTP and T in Lim and Kwon protocol. The
mutual authentication protocol is initiated by Rc in which it
queries T by sending message M1 which holds the random
nonce NRc . T in turn replies with M2, M3, and M4. Rc then
forwards the received messages along with M1 to the TTP
for validation. If the TTP verifies the received messages,
it transmitsM5 to Rc and updates the tag’s records (i.e. EntoldT
and EntnewT ). Rc then forwardsM5 to T which in turn verifies
its integrity. If M5 is verified (i.e. the mutual authentication
succeeded), T updates the backward key chain bT ,KTTP and
the secret key KTTP,T (KTTP,T is refreshed using bT ,KTTP and
the exchanged random nonces) and sets its counter Cnt to 0.
Cnt is used to limit the number of queries to the tag to
prevent the adversaries from querying it endlessly. If the
mutual authentication results in a success, the secrets at the
TTP and T sides are simultaneously renewed in order to
protect the new owner privacy.
In case of failure of mutual authentication, if Cnt is less
than j (the maximum number of allowable authentication
failures), T deterministically updates the secret key KTTP,T
only by using a forward key chain (i.e. KTTP,T = F1(KTTP,T )
and increments Cnt by 1. When Cnt = j, T stops updating its
secret key.
After the TTP and T have successfully authenticated each
other, OT can be carried out in two steps. At first, Rn com-
municates with the TTP through a secure channel in order to
obtain the tag’s information (i.e. EntoldT , Ent
new
T , and IDT ).
After that, it queries T (using the random nonce NRn ) which
eventually leads the tag to update its secrets and this makes it
readable by Rn only.
However; as shown in [14], the tag in Lim and Kwon’s
protocol can be tracked by forcing it to stop updat-
ing its secret. In other words, Adv continues querying T
for more than j times which causes its secret to remain
static.
A year later, Seo et al. [15] tried a different approach
by proposing a protocol for granular data access and OT.
The proposed protocol employs Public Key Infrastruc-
ture (PKI ) [16] and a proxy [17]. A proxy is a personal
RFID-privacy device that writes data into tags and validates
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FIGURE 4. Lim and Kwon protocol.
the data received from owners. If the received data are
verified, the proxy updates the tag secrets. Moreover, some
proxies have access control lists which are used to implement
owners’ privacy policies.
In Seo et al.’s protocol, each owner has its own proxy
which performs six functions: Tag Acquisition, Information
Management, Relabeling, Authentication, Access Control
and Tag Release. In addition, the proxy stores the server
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location (SL) which helps the owners to communicate with
correct BS directly to reduce the searching time. The PKI
is performed on the TTP, the proxy, and the owners side,
whereas the tag carries out only simple bitwise operations
and RNG. The proxy takes its turn in the authorization phase
to achieve granular data access.
As for OT, Rc initiates the process by querying T with
a random nonce. In turn, T replies with CT , where CT
is a ciphertext computed based on El-Gamal cryptography
and was previously written into T . Next, Rc transmits the
encrypted Personal Identification Number (PIN) to Rn which
in turn communicates with the TTP in order to be authenti-
cated. Once Rn is verified, it generates CRn and (PIN )
new and
forwards them to T so that it updates its secrets.
Nevertheless, Adv can track T in Seo et al.’s protocol by
continuously querying it. The tag simply responds by trans-
mitting CT that remains constant as long as T ’s secrets are
not updated. Moreover, Adv can cause de-synchronization by
blocking the last message sent from Rn to T which holds the
new secrets. By doing so, Rn will use the CRn and (PIN )
new,
whereas T will use CT and PIN [18].
Osaka et al. [19] followed an approach similar to Seo et al.
in which they proposed an OT protocol that is based on
using a guardian proxy (PX ) [17], [20]. Their protocol differs
from Seo et al.’s protocol by using the insubvertible encryp-
tion (IE) [21] instead of PKI . In Osaka et al., PX is used to
validate the owners and update the tag’s secrets in case of
successful authentication. Moreover, it performs the required
cryptographic function on behalf of the tag which means that
all the tag needs to do is to store some information. The main
operations used by this protocol are IE , hash function, and
RNG. The TTP acts as a certification authority that gives
certificates to the tag’s owner. The PX participates in both
authentication and OT phases.
For OT phase, the PXRc starts the process by sending a
request to T which responds by sending its information. PXRc
then generates a random nonce and transmits it along with
a ciphertext and an encrypted form of Rc’s certificate to Rc
which, in turn, forwards them to the TTP. The TTP verifies the
received information and, if valid, it releases the ownership of
T from Rc and marks its status as ’’released’’. After that, Rn
obtains the ownership of T by sending a request to the TTP
through PXRc . When the TTP receives the request, it checks
the legitimacy of Rc and whether T is in ’’released’’ state.
If all conditions are met, Rn can be granted the ownership of
T by letting its PXRn communicate with the TTP to write the
new data into T and generate a public-private key pair for Rn.
After that, Rn becomes the new owner of T and T ’s status
becomes ’’available’’.
Another approach for OT using digital signatures was fol-
lowed by Chen et al. in [22]. Chen et al. proposed a protocol
that combines online authentication with digital signatures
in order to resist counterfeiting. Online authentication means
that the BS (represented by the brand company in the pro-
tocol) authenticates the Original Equipment Manufacturers,
the commercial agent, and the TTP (given as the authorized
agent in the protocol) and gives them certificates if the
authentication succeeds. Therefore, only the entities that are
authorized by the BS can verify the digital signatures. Similar
to Osaka et al.’s protocol, T in this protocol is only required
to store information and does not perform any computation.
Moreover, all the current and new owners need to do is to
enter passwords and compute their hash values. As for the
other entities (BS and TTP) they use concatenation, hash
function, and digital signatures.
Before starting OT, Rc needs to prove to Rn that the product
is not a fraud and that it can trust the TTP. The TTP commu-
nicates with T and BS to get verified. After that, both owners
enter their passwords to the TTP which in turn transmits
them in an encrypted form to the BS for validation. If the
BS verifies the received passwords, it generates new secrets,
updates T ’s stored records and sends the new secrets to the
TTP. As a final step, the TTP verifies the received information
and, if found valid, it writes the new secrets into T . Moreover,
the TTP prints for Rn the transaction receipt which includes
the necessary information.
An Adv can track T in Chen et al.’s protocol because
it sends its secret information to the TTP in clear text.
In addition, once Adv knows this secret information, it can
clone the tag. A last note on this protocol is that because
Rc and Rn are required to enter passwords manually in a
secure environment, there is no need for an OT protocol
in the first place and the protocol is not suited for mass
production [23].
In [24], Chen et al. proposed another OT protocol as an
improvement over their anti-counterfeit protocol. The pro-
posed protocol works in a similar approach except that the
tag stores information and also performs computations using
simple bitwise operations and lightweight operations such as
the CRC and RNG. These operations are used by the tag to
send its information in an encrypted form and to verify the
received messages. As for the TTP and the BS, they employ
symmetric key cryptography (SKC) in addition to the same
operations used by the tag to encrypt the exchanged messages
and verify their correctness. Moreover, it adds the 32-bit
Kill and the 32-bit Access passwords (as specified by the
EPC-C1G2 standard) to the structure of the messages and
avoids sending sensitive information in clear text.
Another protocol based on using the CRC and RNG on
the tag’s side was proposed by Chen et al. [25]. The CRC
and RNG are also used by the authorized reader, the TTP,
and the owners. However, the TTP and the owners further
employ PKI and a hash function. Rc starts the OT by sending
tagged-item certificate (CertT ) encrypted to Rn. After that,
the authorized reader performs mutual authentication with T .
When themutual authentication is completed successfully,Rn
decrypts the received message to obtain CertT and, if found
valid, it forwards it to the TTP through the authorized reader.
The TTP then verifies the receivedCertT and generates a new
certificate with its hash value. It sends the new certificate and
its hash to the authorized reader which writes the hash value
into T and then forwards the new certificate to Rn.
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Abyaneh showed in [26] that T in Chen et al.’s protocol can
be traced by Rc who can eventually impersonate it. Therefore,
Chen’s et al.’s protocol does not guarantee the new owner
privacy.
Kulseng et al. [27] focused on proposing a protocol that
supports mutual authentication and OT while simultane-
ously being efficient from a hardware perspective. Thus,
they proposed a protocol that is based on using minimalis-
tic cryptographic primitives such as Physically Unclonable
Functions (PUF) [28] and Linear Feedback Shift Regis-
ters (LFSR) [29]. Moreover, the authors used simple bit-
wise operations such as the XOR. Using PUFs and LFSRs,
which are implemented efficiently in hardware, this protocol
requires only 784 gates for 64-bit variables. Hence, it is
suitable for the cheapest low-cost tags.
Before starting the OT, Rc and T should mutually authen-
ticate each other. After successfully completing the mutual
authentication protocol, Rc forwards to Rn the needed infor-
mation including the key (K2)Rc that belongs to Rc for the
OT. In the meantime, it notifies the TTP about the verification
pair ((K1)Rc , (K2)Rc ) that is used to verify Rn and T . Rn starts
the OT by securely transmitting a request to the TTP along
with (K2)Rc . In its turn, the TTP verifies the received request
in order to authenticate Rn. If the authentication succeeds,
the TTP communicates with T through Rn, which works as
mediator, and forwards the messages between them in order
to update the secrets at both sides. The TTP transmits the new
secrets to Rn so that it becomes the new owner of T and can
perform mutual authentication with it.
Nevertheless, in [30], Kardas et al. revealed several vul-
nerabilities in Kulseng et al.’s protocol. The authors demon-
strated that the mutual authentication protocol is susceptible
to de-synchronization attack which can be accomplished by
message blocking in the third round of the protocol or by
message injection attack. The first de-synchronization attack
can be solved by storing the old secret value at T ’s side which
will be used by Rc if the response from T is not known to it.
Moreover, they showed that IDT can be revealed in one ses-
sion through a disclosure attack launched against the mutual
authentication protocol which eventually leadsAdv to trace T .
This attack can be carried out because of the misuse of
LFSR in hiding the secrets. In order to resist the proposed
disclosure attack, Kardas et al. suggest using a shrinking
generator instead of the LFSR, where shrinking generator is
a lightweight cryptographic primitive that is stronger than
LFSR [31], [32].
The authors also proved that the proposedOT protocol does
not guarantee the new owner privacy because Rc can track the
tag using IDT -which remains constant even after the OT is
completed- and eavesdropping on the messages exchanged
between Rn and T .
Therefore, in [33], Cui proposed mutual authentication
and OT protocols that are considered an enhancement over
Kulseng et al.’s protocols. Cui’s protocols have the same flow
of messages as Kulseng et al.’s protocols. However, the mes-
sage structure is modified in order to resist the previously
mentioned attacks against the mutual authentication protocol
and to increase the security of the OT protocol. Moreover, Cui
suggests storing the old secrets at the tag’s side as a remedy
for resisting the de-synchronization attacks.
Similar to the work in [27], Lo et al. [34] proposed an
OT protocol that focuses on achieving hardware efficiency
by making the tag perform lightweight operations only. The
tag in this protocol employs the XOR operation, a RNG, and
a lightweight Nun function which is built from shift and
addition operations. Lo et al.’s Nun function is a modified
version of the original Nun function which is used to gen-
erate a pseudonym that depends on the tag’s identity [35].
The modified Nun function, however, is used to validate the
integrity of the transmitted messages. This function accepts
two operands: the value to be verified and the random value
used to reshuffle the latter. As for the owners and the TTP,
they use the same operations used by the tag. The TTP adds
the use of a hash function.
Before starting the OT in Lo et al.’s protocol, it is assumed
that Rc and T have mutually authenticated each other. After
that, Rc initiates the OT by sending an OT request to the TTP
which in turn checks if Rc is authentic. If the verification
succeeds, the TTP generates a temporary key and sends it
in an encrypted form to Rc. Rc then re-encrypts the received
key and forwards the result to T . In its turn, T verifies the
received key and, if found valid, it update its secret key to the
received value. After that, the TTP sends the temporary key
and IDT to Rn which then generates a new key and transmits it
encrypted to T . T then verifies the received key and if found
valid, it updates its secret key to the received value and by
that Rn becomes the new owner.
Niu et al. [37] proposed a protocol that employs simple
bitwise operations (such as the permutation [36]) in addition
to a RNG while taking into consideration the importance of
efficient hardware implementation. All parameters are of 96-
bit length and to simplify the implementation, each 96-bit
value is divided into 16-bit words. Thus, the computations
are performed six times to obtain the 96-bit result.
In Niu et al.’s protocol, Rc starts by performing mutual
authentication with T and when completed successfully,
the OT can be initiated. The OT is started by the TTP which
updates the master key that is shared with Rc and T to a
new value and then it sends the new master key via a secure
channel to Rn. After that, the TTP transmits the new master
key in an encrypted form to T which checks its validity. If the
verification succeeds, it updates its master key to the new
value. As a last step, Rn and T need to mutually authenticate
each other in order confirm the success of OT
Based on the analysis of Bagheri et al. [38], it was shown
that Niu et al.’s protocol cannot resist secret disclosure and
de-synchronization attacks.
The authors proposed several disclosure attacks that are
based on one fact that the messages in Niu et al.’s protocol
are generated by 16-bit RNGs and each 96-bit message is
broken into 16-bit words. Adv computes, in off-line mode,
a table which holds the pairs (x,RNG(x)) for 0 ≤ x < 216.
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Thus, if Adv has RNG(x), it can find the associated x value by
looking it up in the table.
In addition, the authors showed that a de-synchronization
attack can be launched against the mutual authentication
phase of the protocol.
On the other hand, Taqieddin et al. [39] proposed an
enhancement to Niu et al.’s protocol such that it can resist the
attacks proposed in [38]. The proposed improvement involves
using the bitwise conversion operation [40] and Hamming
Weight-based left rotation instead of the 16-bit RNG and
the permutation operation in order to secure the protocol
from disclosure attacks. The enhanced protocol adds extra
messages to Niu et al’s mutual authentication protocol and
employs the old-IDS-denial mechanism [41].
We end this section with the cloud-based RFID OT proto-
col (CROP) which was recently proposed by Cao et al. [42].
As the name implies, CROP is an OT protocol that is designed
for cloud-based applications. It is based on the quadratic
residue property and on the existence of a cloud provider that
is responsible for storing the owners and tags information.
In other words, in cloud-based systems, the provider carries
out the role of the TTP. The main operations employed in
the protocol are bitwise operations, RNG and a hash function.
Since the tag does not perform hash functions, the protocol is
compliant with the EPC-C1G2 standard.
In cloud-based environments there are usually two
assumptions:
• The cloud database is insecure and the adversaries can
compromise it.
• The communications between the readers, tags, and
cloud database are performed throughwireless channels.
Thus, Adv can eavesdrop on the exchanged messages.
Hence, two security requirements need to be considered in
cloud-based systems:
• Data Privacy of the Cloud-storage service: The cloud
database protects the privacy of the stored information
by encrypting the keys of the readers and tags.
• Access anonymity of the inquiry service: The cloud
database achieves anonymity of the access and inquiry
service by encrypting the messages exchanged between
the readers and the tags.
In designing CROP, the authors took into account the
importance of achieving these two security properties.
The cloud provider stores an encrypted hash table (EHT ).
The EHT pre-stores the encrypted keys for every reader
and its purpose is to secure the access anonymity and the
stored information from untrusted cloud providers. The EHT
consists of several records where each record is identified
by a unique index. The index is a hash digest that uniquely
indicates the current record (or session) of the owner.
CROP begins with an off-line authentication phase in
which Rn sends an OT request to T which replies with
its encrypted information. Rn then forwards the informa-
tion necessary to authenticate T to Rc. It also sends a pre-
stored random nonce in an encrypted form to Rc through
a secure channel. In turn, Rc employs the received
information to verify T and, if found authentic, it responds
with an acknowledgment (ACKRc ). After that, Rc sends a
hash value of its secrets to the TTP (represented by the cloud
provider in the protocol) via a Virtual Private Network (VPN )
channel in order to get authenticated. TTP in turn searches in
the EHT for Rc’s record and then sends the contents of the
record securely to Rn through a VPN channel. It should be
noted that this step is the only step that is performed on-line
by interacting with the TTP in this phase. Rn then checks the
validity of the received information and, if verified, it authen-
ticates Rc. Next, Rn sends the previously received ACKRc
along with the encrypted pre-stored random nonce to T .
By that the off-line authentication phase is completed.
The OT phase starts immediately once the previous phase
is completed. T employs the received information to authenti-
cate both Rc and Rn. If the authentication results in a success,
it sends its key KRc,T in an encrypted form to Rn which in
turn verifies its validity. If found valid, Rn generates a new
key and uses it to compute the acknowledgment, AckRn . After
that, Rn performs an on-line authentication with TTP in the
same way Rc did. If the TTP authenticates Rn, it replies with
both the record’s index and content. In turn, Rn decrypts
the received index to obtain the necessary information and
then it generates a ciphertext by encrypting the received
record’s content and AckRn and update its key KRn . Next,
Rn employs the new KRn to update its record’s index and
content and then forwards them to the TTP through a VPN
channel. Upon receiving the information, the TTP updates
Rn’s record accordingly. Rn transmits the ciphertext, AckRn ,
and its original record’s content (i.e.; before the update) to
T which verifies the received ciphertext and then updates its
secrets to new values.
TABLE 3. Main themes of EPC-compliant TTP-based single OT protocols.
Table 3 lists the main themes of the EPC-compliant
TTP-based single OT protocols.
In this section, we discussed the EPC-compliant
TTP-based single OT protocols. Approximately half the
protocols violate at least one of the following properties: the
old owner privacy, the new owner privacy, and the resistance
to the windowing problem. Moreover, only four protocols
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provide OD or AR, whereas only two can support mobile
readers. On the other hand, none of the discussed protocols
provide exclusive OT.
Half of the presented EPC-compliant TTP-based single OT
protocols cannot defend against at least one of the security
attacks which are summarized in Section II-A.
2) NON-EPC-COMPLIANT TTP-BASED SINGLE OWNERSHIP
TRANSFER PROTOCOLS
One of the earliest OT protocols that appeared after
Saito et al.’s protocol, is the work of Molnar et al. [10].
This is a scalable protocol that is based on using a series (in
the form of tree) of encrypted pseudonyms (secrets). The
pseudonyms are generated by both the TTP and tag using
a PRF and are updated each time the tag is queried. The
employed PRF is implemented using SKC . In addition to
using PRF , the participating entities can use RNG.
In order for Rc to query T , it requests pseudonyms from the
TTP. The TTP gives Rc a series of upcoming q pseudonyms
so that it can decrypt the pseudonyms encrypted by T without
referring to the TTP. This procedure is followed for scalabil-
ity reasons. Once the series of q pseudonyms is consumed, Rc
communicates again with the TTP to request another series
and so on.
To initiate the OT, Rn sends an OT request to the TTP
which updates its security policy so that only Rn can request
pseudonyms. Therefore any subsequent requests from Rc will
not be honored. Occasionally, before the OT takes place,
a series of pseudonyms could have been given to Rc. Hence,
if this series of pseudonyms is not exhausted, T can still be
accessed byRc which violates the new owner privacy. In order
to handle such situation, two approaches can be used. The first
one is called soft killing where Rn continuously queries T
until the series of pseudonyms that belong to Rc is consumed.
In the second approach, Rn communicates with T in order
to lead it to increase its counter such that it leaps over Rc’s
pseudonyms. The first approach is carried out by performing
several queries without any key exchange, whereas in the
second, two key exchanges are needed.
Nevertheless, if an Adv compromises T in Molnar el
al.’s protocol, it may reveal the other tags’ information and
employs it for tracking [43].
Similar to Molnar et al., Fouladgar and Afifi’s work fol-
lowed an approach in which an owner can identify T ’s
encrypted pseudonyms without referring to the TTP for a
specified number of times, Cnt [44]. However, the owner
does not receive a series of pseudonyms, rather it receives the
key necessary to decrypt them. Moreover, the participating
entities encrypt the pseudonyms by using a hash function.
In addition to the hash function, this protocol employs simple
bitwise operations and a RNG.
In Fouladgar and Afifi’s protocol, Rn initiates the OT by
sending a query to T which in turn increments its Cnt and
replies with NT and an encrypted form of its secret key
(K1)TTP,T . Rn then forwards the received information along
with an OT flag (FOT ) and its credentials (CerdRn ) to the
TTP in order to get authenticated. If Rn is authenticated,
the TTP sends the stored T ’s keys ((K1)TTP,T and (K2)TTP,T )
encrypted to it. The purpose of the key (K1)TTP,T is to decrypt
T ’s pseudonyms, whereas (K2)TTP,T is used to update its
secrets. In turn, Rn forwards the received message to T so
that it sets its Cnt to the maximum value. After that, Rn
queries T again which, in turn, responds by another NT
and an encrypted form of (K2)TTP,T . Rn passes the received
information along withCerdRn to the TTPwhich then verifies
them and then retrieves IDT and updates T ’s keys by using the
random nonce NTTP. The TTP then sends NTTP and (K2)TTP,T
in encrypted form to Rn which forwards them to T to allow it
update its keys.
After that, Rn sends a query to T to increment its Cnt
and then replies with another NT and an encrypted form
of (K1)TTP,T . Upon receiving the information, Rn forwards
it along with CerdRn to the TTP which verifies it and
then responds with IDT and (K1)TTP,T . Finally, Rn employs
the received information to identify the tag. Rn can con-
tinue accessing the tag until the Cnt reaches the maximum
value.
The authors proposed an enhancement to their work
in [45]. In the enhanced protocol, SKC is employed instead
of the hash function. In addition, the authors stated that if Rn
does not trust the BS of Rc (BSRc ), then T ’s keys must be
transferred to its BS before the OT can take place. However,
BSRc should keep a copy of the keys in caseRc needs to access
T after the OT. In such a case, BSRn can force T to change its
keys back to the old values.
However, the work in [46] indicates that an Adv can
impersonate Rn to obtain IDT by capturing the clear text
of CerdRn and replaying it to the TTP. The attack succeeds
in case Rn uses a mobile reader in Fouladgar and Afifi’s
protocols. In addition, Adv can impersonate T by capturing
NT and the encrypted (K1)TTP,T and replaying them to the
owner since it does not keep track of the replayed values.
A solution is suggested to handle the tag impersonation by
having the owner use a counter to limit the maximum number
of received replays that use the same (K1)TTP,T value.
Moreover, Jin et al. [47] noted that Fouladgar and Afifi’s
enhanced protocol [45] is subject to tracking attacks that vio-
late the new owner privacy because (K1)TTP,T and (K2)TTP,T
remain static after the OT unless the server intentionally
changes them. Moreover, since this same issue is present in
their hash-based protocol (i.e. SiDeS), we find that SiDeS is
vulnerable to the same tracking attacks.
Another approach that is based on using hashing was pro-
posed by Ahamed et al. in [48]. YA-SRAP is a protocol that
does not require the existence of a BS for the authentication
of owners and tags or for the OT. In this protocol, the TTP is
responsible of deploying the tags and authorizing the owners.
If Rc is authorized by the TTP, it obtains a contact list that
contains information about the tags that are accessible to it.
For each T , the contact list contains IDT and the secret key
KTTP,Rc,T . Using the contact list, Rc can identify T without a
need for a BS and this makes YA-SRAP scalable. In addition
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to the hash function, this protocol employs simple bitwise
operations and a RNG.
Before starting the OT process, Rc and T have to authen-
ticate each other. Therefore Rc sends a request and a random
nonce to T which in turn responds by transmitting its secret
key KTTP,Rc,T in an encrypted form. Rc then tries to authen-
ticate T by searching all records in the contact list until a
match is found. If T is verified, Rc updatesKTTP,Rc,T to a new
value and then it sends an encrypted random value to T . If T
validates the received information, it updates its key similarly.
After that, Rc initiates the OT by sending T ’s informa-
tion (i.e.; IDT and the new key) to the TTP. The TTP then
updates the contact list of Rn (after being authorized) with T ’s
information and removes this information from Rc’s contact
list and by that only Rn can access T .
In [49], Xei et al. discussed the main advantages and vul-
nerabilities of YA-SRAP protocol. There are two advantages
of the protocol. First, all readers are identical (i.e. there is no
unique identifier for each reader) and this protects the privacy
of the holders. Second, the protocol provides OT in an offline
environment and ensures the old and new owner privacy
because after transferring T ’s ownership to Rn, T ’s secret will
continue to be updated in each authentication session.
As for the vulnerabilities, the first one is that the protocol
is device-dependent. That is, if the reader that was loaded
with the contact list is missing, T ’s owner in an offline loca-
tion (i.e.; where it cannot communicate with the TTP) may
not be able to authenticate the tags unless it reloads a different
reader with the contact list in an online environment. The sec-
ond drawback is that the protocol is not scalable because
all records in the owner’s contact list need to be searched
(i.e. brute force search) in order to authenticate a tag. This
needs O(n) complexity, where n is the number of tags in
the system. Thus, increasing the number of tags decreases
the efficiency of the protocol. On a final note, YA-SRAP is
susceptible to de-synchronization attack by blocking or mod-
ifying the last message sent from Rc to T . This results from
the fact that T does not send an acknowledgment to Rc.
As for Rekleitis et al., they proposed a protocol that
employs hashing as in Fouladgar and Afifi [44] and
Ahamed et al.’s [48] protocols. However, they added the use
of timestamps to their protocol [50]. In their work, the authors
discussed the security and privacy policies that should be
adhered to in order to achieve fine granularity and context-
aware information in RFID systems. Based on these policies,
they proposed a tag management protocol that has a modular
design and can perform tag authentication and OT operations.
Modular design means that all operations in the protocol are
designed in a unified form in order to enhance the implemen-
tation efficiency. The protocol uses simple bitwise operations
and RNG.
Since this protocol uses timestamps in the computation
of the messages, one of the shared secrets between the TTP
and T is a time value called horizon. This values specifies a
certain point in time and is publicly known. The employed
time standard in Rekleitis et al.’s protocol is ISO 8601
international standard [51]. This protocol does not need syn-
chronized clocks between the TTP and T .
OT is initiated with an authentication phase in order to
authenticate T . The TTP starts the authentication phase by
sending its identity IDE(TTP), a random nonce, and the
current time to T . T then compares the received time value
with the stored horizon and if it is older, it sets the current time
value to horizon. After that, T encrypts its key KTTP,T using
the current horizon and other values then transmits the result
to the TTP. The TTP then verifies the received encrypted
key using its secret and, if found valid, it confirms that the
concerned tag has been identified and authenticated.
After that, the TTP starts the second phase in which it
forwards to T a new horizon value (i.e. (horizon)new) and
the desired operation (Oper) (Oper in this case is OT).
T , in turn, responds by sending a random nonce NT . After
receiving T ’s response, the TTP computes a checksum
value equal to H (Oper,NT ,Rep(H (KTTP,T ), currenttime −
horizon) ⊕ (horizon)new) and sends it to T . Next, the TTP
employs the computed checksum to update the secret key
KTTP,T and then sets its horizon value to (horizon)new.
T checks whether the received checksum value is valid. If the
verification succeeds, it updates KTTP,T and horizon in the
same way the TTP did.
It should be noted that each time the second phase is
executed, T ’s time is set to the current time.
In addition, the proposed protocol supports tag re-
initialization operation. This operation is performed by the
owner in order to interrupt the linkability between the succes-
sive secret key values and can be carried out using the second
phase of the protocol. The authors stated that this operation
should be performed in a safe period where the adversaries
that know the current secret key value cannot eavesdrop on
the communication.
Osaka et al. tried a different approach in which they used
hashing and SKC to propose an OT protocol that was later
used as the base for many other protocols [52]. Their protocol
also employs simple bitwise operations and a RNG.
The protocol exchange is started by Rc who sends a query
and a random nonce NRc to T . T responds by sending its
secret key EKall (IDT ) in an encrypted form to Rc which in
turn forwards it along with NRc to the TTP for verification.
Moreover, Rc generates a new key KRc and transmits it to
the TTP. TTP verifies the received encrypted EKall (IDT ) and
if found valid, it decrypts it and then retrieves the item’s
related information Info(IDT ). Moreover, the TTP encrypts
IDT using KRc (i.e. computes EKRc (IDT ) and then it updates
itsKall toKRc and EKall (IDT ) to EKRc (IDT ) respectively. After
that, the TTP sends the EKRc (IDT ) in an encrypted form
along with Info(IDT ) to Rc. In turn, Rc uses Info(IDT ) to
identify T and then forwards EKRc (IDT ) to it. T then extracts
EKRc (IDT ) from the received message and employs it as its
new secret key.
Next, Rc changes its key Kall to KRc in order to protect
its own privacy and then forwards the new key along with
IDT and Info(IDT ) to Rn through a secure channel. Rn then
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changes the received key to a new value (i.e. KRn ) so that its
privacy is protected and then employs this key for subsequent
transactions.
T in Osaka et al.’s protocol can be tracked by blocking the
first message sent from Rc to T and then transmitting (query,
NRc = 0) instead. Moreover, when the TTP updates the secret
key to EKRc (IDT ), Adv can record the last message sent from
Rc to T and use it track the tag by sending it in place of NRc
during the next session. In addition to tracking, Adv can cause
de-synchronization by blocking the last message sent from Rc
to T or by adding some noise to it [18].
In order to secure Osaka et al.’s protocol from these attacks,
several works have tried to improve the protocol by modify-
ing the original messages, adding new messages, or changing
the protocol’s structure [53]–[58]. However, some of these
protocols still suffer from tracking and de-synchronization
attacks. Even worse, some of them violate the new owner
privacy and are susceptible to disclosure and impersonation
attacks [18], [23].
Similar to Osaka et al., Kapoor and Piramuthu [46] pro-
posed a protocol that employs simple bitwise operations,
RNG, SKC , and a hash function. The protocol is designed for
scenarios that involve multi-tagged objects and the authors
demonstrated their protocol using a generic case where only
one tag is involved. Thus, we consider the work of Kapoor
and Piramuthu as a single OT protocol.
Rn starts the OT process by sending an OT request to the
TTP which, in turn, generates a new key KTTP,Rn,T and sends
it in an encrypted form to T . T decrypts the received message
to extract the new key and then it re-encrypts it using its
secrets and sends the result to the TTP as an acknowledgment.
After that, the TTP transmits to Rc the key KTTP,Rc in an
encrypted form and a revoke message to inform it that its
privileges have been revoked. As for Rn, it sends to it the
encrypted KTTP,Rn,T and a grant message to give it a full
permission over T . Rn in turn decrypts the received message
to get KTTP,Rn,T and acknowledges the reception by encrypt-
ing the obtained key using its secret KTTP,Rc and sending the
result back. Rn performs an authentication handshake with
T to confirm the OT success. Thus, Rn generates a random
nonce and sends it encrypted to T to confirm that it has
obtained the new key. T then decrypts the received message
and sends an acknowledgment to Rn to confirm the same.
Another approach was taken by Yang [8] who proposed
the lightweight OT protocol (LOTP) in order to perform
OT across different authorities in a mobile RFID environ-
ment. The term ’’different authorities’’ means that Rc and
Rn are under the authority of different back-end servers.
This protocol employs lightweight cryptography (LE) on T ’s
side such as DESLite [59] and Grain [60] in an attempt to
reduce the complexity of the performed operations. As for the
other parties, they employ SKC . In addition to LE and SKC ,
the protocol uses simple bitwise operations and a RNG.
Yang noted that the key to secure OT in mobile RFID
environments is to secure the communication between the
participating entities. Therefore, the OT protocol starts with
a mutual authentication phase to authenticate T . In order
to achieve mutual authentication in this protocol, techniques
such as Kerberos [61] and PKI are used.
Rc starts the OT process with the authentication phase by
sending an OT request to T which then responds with its
information (its secret keys and identity) in an encrypted
form. Upon receiving the information, Rc then re-encrypts the
received information and transmits it to BSRc for validation.
If the verification succeeds, BSRc initiates the next phase
by sending T ’s information that is necessary for OT and
IDE(Rn) encrypted to BSRn . From the received information,
BSRn knows that T ’s ownership will be transferred to Rn.
Thus after verifying IDE(T ), it transmits T ’s information and
IDE(BSRc ) in an encrypted form to the TTP as a request
to update the key KBSRc ,T . The TTP verifies the received
information and, if found valid, it randomly generates a new
key, encrypts it using the key KTTP,Rc , and sends the result to
BSRn . Moreover, the TTP encrypts the new key using its key
KTTP,T and then re-encrypts the result using key KTTP,Rc and
transmits it to BSRc .
When BSRn receives the message, it extracts the new key
and employs it to manage T from this time forth. Also, BSRn
assigns a new identity for T and registers Rn as the new owner
for T . As for BSRc , it validates the received information and,
if verified, it sends the encrypted new key and an FOT in an
encrypted form to Rc which, in turn, forwards them to T . T
verifies the received information and then it updates KTTP,Rc
to the received new key to complete the OT.
Note that although the main focus of LOTP is on OT
in different authorities, it can also support OT in the same
authority.
As for Zhou et al. [62], they proposed a protocol for health
care supply chains [62] using SKC . The proposed protocol
involves third party logistics providers (TPL) that transfer the
tagged items between Rc and Rn when they are at different
locations. Thus, T ’s ownership needs to be transferred tem-
porarily from Rc to the TPL until the item is delivered to Rn.
Both the owner and the TPL need to access T and this can
be carried out using two keys; the primary (main) key for the
owner and the temporary (sub) key for the TPL. Themain-key
is shared between the owner and T , whereas the sub-key is
shared between the owner, the TPL, and T . Therefore, in this
protocol the owner’s key is a composition of both the main-
key and sub-key. Other operations used in this protocol are
simple bitwise operations and a RNG.
Zhou et al.’s protocol aims to achieve two goals: OT
between Rc and Rn and granting permission to the TPL to
directly access T by giving it the sub-key. The TPL obtains
the sub-key at the point-of-origin and returns it back at the
destination point, hence it is assumed that there are two
TTPs, one in each point. The TTPs are treated as one entity
because they are assumed to be identical and can communi-
cate directly with each other through secure channels.
This protocol consists of four loops: In the first loop, Rc
informs the TTP about a change in the tagged item status,
the change can be an OT between Rc and Rn or transfer
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through the TPL or both. Thus in this loop, Rc sends its
composite key in an encrypted form to the TTP. In situations
where only the sub-key needs to be changed (i.e. there is no
owner change) the sub-key value is set to null. In the second
loop, the TTP generates a newmain-key and informsRn about
it. Rn responds by generating a new sub-key for T when
necessary (i.e. when there is no owner change but a TPL
is involved) and sends it in an encrypted form to the TTP.
Next, the TTP informs T about the newmain-key and the new
sub-key (if it has been changed) in the third loop. After that,
the TTP informs the TPL about the new sub-key in the fourth
loop. This loop is optional because it is carried out only if a
new sub-key has been generated. When the TTP completes
the optional fourth loop, it sends an acknowledgment to Rc.
By this, the first loop is completed and so is the OT.
Another SKC-based approach was proposed by Chen et al.
in [63]. The authors proposed mutual authentication and OT
protocols for mobile RFID systems in supply chains. These
protocols aim to provide secure OT for the different roles
in the supply chains. The TTP is responsible of initializing
the parties in the system, controlling the goods’ positions,
connecting the supply chain with good mobility, assigning
permissions to parties and performing quick transfer. In addi-
tion to SKC , the proposed protocols utilize a RNG.
The authors proposed three protocols; the mutual authen-
tication protocol, the OT protocol and the tag key update
protocol. The purpose of themutual authentication protocol is
to ensure the legitimacy of the owner and to assign the user’s
authority by the administrator.
As for the OT protocol, it takes into consideration the
different parties that exist in the supply chain environments.
Thus, the authors demonstrated three cases for OT; server-to-
server, reader-to-server and reader-to-reader.
In the server-to-server case the ownership is transferred
from the upstream firm BS1 to the midstream firm BS2. BS2
starts the process by generating a random nonce NBS2 and
sending it along with an OT request in encrypted form to the
TTP. The TTP in turn replies with the encrypted IDE(BS1),
KTTP,BS1 andNBS2 . In addition, the TTP informsBS1 about the
transfer by transmitting to it IDE(BS1), IDE(BS2),NBS2 and a
transferring message (info) in an encrypted form. In its turn,
BS1 encrypts IDE(BS1), the received NBS2 and T ’s key KT
and sends the result to BS2. At last, BS2 verifies the received
information and if the validation succeeds, it extracts KT and
records it for future use.
As for the reader-to-server case the ownership is trans-
ferred from the downstream server BS to the owner R. To ini-
tiate the OT, the TTP generates a random nonce NBS and then
transmits it along with info and IDE(BS) in an encrypted
form to R. In its turn, R decrypts the received message and
then encrypts IDE(R), info and NBS and sends the result
to BS. After BS receives the message, it re-encrypts it and
forwards the result to the TTP. The TTP then validates the
received information and, if verified, it sends the key KT in
an encrypted form to BS. BS obtains KT by decrypting the
received message.
The reader-to-reader case covers the OT from Rc to Rn.
The OT is started by Rc which transmits IDE(Rc) and info
encrypted to Rn. Rn, in turn, replies by generating a random
nonce NRn and sending it along with the received message
and an OT command in encrypted form to the TTP. The
TTP verifies the integrity of the received information and
then encrypts KT and transmits the result to Rn. Rn then
verifies whether the received message is valid or not. If the
validation succeeds, it extracts KT and by that the OT is
completed.
When the OT (in any of the three mentioned cases) is
completed successfully, T ’s key should be updated. Thus,
BSRn initiates the update process by transmitting a request to
T . T , in turn, generates a random nonce NT and then encrypts
along with IDE(T ) and transmits the result to the BSRn . Upon
receiving themessage,BSRn re-encrypts it and sends the result
to the TTP. When the TTP receives the message, it checks
the integrity of IDE(BSRn ) and IDE(T ). If the verification
succeeds, the TTP generates a new key and then forwards
it to BSRn in an encrypted form. BSRn in turn verifies the
received information and if found valid, it updates its KT
to the received new key. After that, BSRn encrypts the new
key and sends it to T . T verifies the integrity of the received
message and then updates its key KT to the new key value.
TABLE 4. Main themes of non-EPC-compliant TTP-based single OT
protocols.
Table 4 summarizes the main themes for non-EPC-
compliant TTP-based single OT protocols.
Unfortunately, most of the non-EPC-compliant TTP-based
single OT protocols do not achieve old owner privacy, new
owner privacy, nor resistance against the windowing problem.
Furthermore, only five papers provide OD and none offer AR.
As for the exclusive OT and support of mobile readers, we see
that none of the discussed protocols offer the former and only
two can support the latter.
Although these protocols use cryptographic functions such
as hashing and SKC , most of the proposed protocols in this
category cannot resist at least one of the aforementioned
attacks.
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B. TTP-BASED GROUP OWNERSHIP
TRANSFER PROTOCOLS
Similar to the TTP-based single OT protocols, group OT
protocols are also classified into EPC-compliant and non-
EPC-compliant. We start this section by covering the
EPC-compliant protocols and then discuss the non-EPC-
compliant ones.
1) EPC-COMPLIANT TTP-BASED GROUP OWNERSHIP
TRANSFER PROTOCOLS
In the reviewed literature, only one protocol that falls under
the EPC-compliant group OT category was found [64]. This
protocol, proposed by Sundaresan et al., handles the OT in
multi-tag multi-owner scenarios and focuses on achieving the
privacy-among-owners (or individual-owner-privacy) prop-
erty. The privacy-among-owners states that when multiple
owners share the ownership of tags, each individual owner’s
privacy should be preserved (i.e. the communication between
an owner and its tags should not be known to or accessed
by the other owners). The proposed protocol implements the
privacy-among-owners concept through the generation of a
different secret for each new owner. The main operations
employed in this protocol are simple bitwise operations and
a RNG. Moreover, in order to prevent the adversaries from
extracting any information from the exchanged messages,
the protocol hides each generated random nonce by using a
blind factor (i.e. in a message that contains the random nonce
and other secrets).
OT is initiated by sending FOT from the group of the
current owners (GroupRc ) to the TTP. After receiving the
request, the TTP generates a new key for each Rn in the group
of new owners (GroupRn ) and then sends to it the new secret
and Info(IDT ) for each T in the group of tags (GroupT ) in an
encrypted form. When each Rn receives the TTP’s messages,
it checks the validity of the messages and confirms whether it
is indented for it. If the verification succeeds, Rn extracts its
new secret and Info(IDT ) for each T and then replies with an
acknowledgment. After the TTP receives and authenticates
the acknowledgments from all owners in GroupRn , it trans-
mits the identity and the new secret that are associated with
each Rn in GroupRn to each T in GroupT . In its turn, each
T in GroupT verifies the received messages and if found,
it extracts the received new secrets and identities. Next, each
T in GroupT responds by sending an acknowledgment to the
TTP. When the TTP validates the acknowledgments received
from all tags in GroupT , it transmits a confirmation message
to all owners in GroupRc to confirm the OT.
In addition to the OT protocol, the authors proposed an
ownership test protocol so that the new owners can confirm
the successful completion of the OT. The new owners perform
the test protocol to confirm that they can access all tags
in GroupT . The ownership test protocol is performed in a
safe environment without adversarial interventions and the
messages are not encrypted. If test process is to be done in an
insecure environment, then a mutual authentication protocol
should be used for the ownership test.
This protocol is designed to transfer the ownership of all
tags in GroupT to the new owners. However, the authors
stated that the protocol can be easily modified to support
other scenarios. Two scenarios are given to explain the idea;
the first one is for transferring the ownership of some of
the tags in GroupT to the new owners. In order to handle
this scenario, the current owners send IDT of the tags whose
ownership will be transferred along with FOT . After that,
the TTP executes the OT protocol only for this subset of tags.
The second scenario is for situations where tags need to join
GroupT or leave it. To handle this scenario, the current owners
cooperate with the TTP to remove T ’s IDT from GroupT
(in case T needs to leave the group) or to add IDT to it
(in case T needs to join GroupT ).
Nevertheless, in [65] Munilla et al. revealed the weak-
nesses of Sundaresan et al.’s protocol and demonstrated that
it is susceptible to the following attacks: de-synchronization
and/or replay, tag traceability, impersonation, and forward
secrecy. In their cryptanalysis, the authors focused on the step
in which the TTP communicates with the tags in GroupT
because it has the vulnerabilities that lead to the proposed
attacks. It was proven that Sundaresan et al.’s protocol does
not guarantee the old and new owner privacy which was the
main aim of the protocol.
We covered the EPC-compliant TTP-based group OT
protocols. We see that only one protocol [64] falls under
this category. This hints towards the need to design other
EPC-compliant TTP-based group OT protocols. This is
still an open research area, especially with the fact the
EPC-compliant protocols are more suitable for supply chain
applications of RFID systems.
The main theme of this protocol is based on the use
RNG and the support of multi-tag multi-owner. However,
it achieves neither the old owner privacy nor the new owner
privacy. It also does not offer exclusive OT, OD, or AR neither
does it support mobile readers. The protocol does succeed in
resisting the windowing problem.
This protocol cannot resist any of the threats as has been
shown in this section.
2) NON-EPC-COMPLIANT TTP-BASED GROUP OWNERSHIP
TRANSFER PROTOCOLS
We start this section with the first group OT protocol, which
was proposed by Zuo [66]. Zuo’s protocol simultaneously
transfers the ownership of the tags in GroupT from Rc to Rn
(i.e. handles multi-tag single-owner scenario). This protocol
employs grouping-proofs in order to prove the existence of
multiple tags at the same time and to ensure that no two parties
will hold the authentication information of T at the same
time during the ownership process (i.e. solves the windowing
problem). The operations involved in the protocol are simple
bitwise operations, aRNG and a hash function.Moreover, this
protocol utilizes SKC (e.g. AES or 3DES) on the back-end
servers side only.
Although Zuo’s protocol can be used with any number
of tags, the author demonstrated the working procedure of
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the protocol assuming that GroupT consists of two tags
(T1 and T2) for simplicity. Moreover, it is assumed that all
parties in the system are able to identify the tags within a
group.
BSRn starts theOT process by sendingFOT toBSRc which in
turn verifies the received request. After validating the request,
BSRc issues an order for Rc to scan all tags in GroupT and
to verify whether all members are present. In Zuo’ proto-
col, it is assumed that Rc scans the tags by using ALOHA
scheme [67], [68]. If the verification fails, the process is
terminated. Otherwise, BSRc sends an acknowledgment to
BSRn which then generates a new key for each T in GroupT
Next, BSRn chooses two new keys for each T in GroupT ;
the first key is shared with the new owner (i.e. KBSRn ,T1 and
KBSRn ,T2 ), whereas the second is shared with the other tags in
the group (i.e.; KBSRn ,Rn,GroupT ). Afterwards, BSRn encrypts
the new keys and transmits them in a secure manner to Rc
with the help of BSRc and the TTP. This protocol encrypts the
new keys in way such that only T1 and T2 can obtain them.
After Rc receives the encrypted new keys, it transmits them
to T1 and T2 simultaneously.
When T1 and T2 receives Rc’s messages, they check their
validity. If T1 verifies themessage, it computes twomessages:
(M1)T1 which hides the key KBSRc ,Rc,GroupT and (M2)T1 which
encrypts the key KRc,T1 . After that, T1 sends (M1)T1 and
(M2)T1 to Rc which in turn stores (M1)T1 (to be used as part
of the group OT proof) and forwards (M2)T1 to T2. As for T2,
if it has authenticated the message received from Rc, it uses
the received (M2)T1 to authenticate T1 (i.e. confirms that T1
belongs to GroupT ).
After verifying T1, T2 updates its KBSRc ,T2 to KBSRn ,T2 and
KBSRc ,Rc,GroupT to KBSRn ,Rn,GroupT and then hides KBSRn ,T2
in (M1)T2 and KBSRn ,Rn,GroupT in (M2)T2 , respectively. Next,
it transmits (M1)T2 and (M2)T2 to Rc. Again, Rc keeps (M1)T2
as a part of the group OT proof and forwards (M2)T2 to T1.
In its turn, T1 updates KBSRc ,Rc,GroupT to KBSRn ,Rn,GroupT
and checks whether the received (M2)T2 is valid (i.e. to
authenticate T2). If the verification results in success, T1
updates KBSRc ,T1 to KBSRn ,T1 and then transmits KBSRn ,T1 and
KBSRn ,Rn,GroupT encrypted in (M3)T1 to Rc. When Rc receives
(M3)T1 , it is employed it along with previously stored (M1)T1
and (M1)T2 to generate the group OT proof and then forwards
the proof to BSRn , the TTP, and BSRc for validation.
It should be noted that in Zuo’s protocol, each tag has a
timer that specifies the time limit in which a tag can generate
a valid proof.
The OT process is completed with a verification process
in which BSRn communicates in a challenge-response mode
with all tags in GroupT simultaneously by using a grouping-
proofs protocol or with each T individually by using a tag-
reader authentication protocol. However, if not all secret keys
of the tags have been verified, the entire protocol must be
repeated. In this case, BSRc employs its old secrets with the
assistance of the TTP to reset the tags.
Zuo’s protocol ensures an atomic group OT by confirming
that all tags have updated their keys in the same session
(i.e. either all successful or nothing at all). Moreover, it fol-
lows the concept presented in [69] which states that it is
preferable to authenticate group members early rather than
leaving it after the protocol terminates. Detecting non-group
members early can help in avoiding the waste of resources
which may be considered a DoS vulnerability.
As in Zuo’s protocol, another set of group OT protocols
that employ simple bitwise operations, RNG, hashing and
SKC were proposed by Kapoor et al. to handle the OT of the
multi-tagged and multi-owner objects in supply chains [70].
However, in Kapoor et al., the tags are the only entities
that cannot use SKC . There are two protocols proposed by
Kapoor et al.; the first one handles the situation where a group
of owners will transfer the ownership of a tagged object to a
group of new owners (i.e. single-tag multi-owner scenario),
whereas the other transfers the ownership of a group of
tags (two or more) from Rc to Rn (i.e. multi-tag single-owner
scenario). In fact, the two protocols are modeled after the
single OT protocol that was proposed in [46] and previously
discussed in Section III-A2.
In addition to the proposed OT protocols, Kapoor et al.
proposed a mutual authentication protocol so that the new
owner(s) can authenticate the tag(s) after OT has taken place.
In all protocols, it is assumed that all involved owners are
present or reachable from the tag(s) at the same time.
The first protocol works using exactly the same procedure
of the protocol discussed in Section III-A2. However, the pro-
cedure is repeated for each owner in GroupRc and GroupRn
and slightly changes the messages’ structure.
It is worth mentioning that the first protocol covers two
possible cases. The first one is that the tagged object is
considered a base object and its components are just parts of
it. Hence, the OT is performed only once for the entire object.
As for the second case, the object is not a base one. Thus,
the object does not exist without the individual components.
For this case, the OT protocol needs to be repeated for each
component and this can be performed either sequentially or in
parallel.
Nevertheless, in [71], Bagheri et al. showed that
Kapoor et al.’s protocol has a windowing problem and is
susceptible to de-synchronization attack. In their analysis,
the authors assumed that T updates its key to the new value
after receivingRn response. The proposed de-synchronization
attack de-synchronizes the tag forever with a success prob-
ability of one while needing only two runs of the protocol
sessions. To perform the de-synchronization attack, all an
Adv needs to do is to block some messages and replay some
of eavesdropped ones without modification. Furthermore,
the authors proposed an enhancement in order to resist the
windowing problem and the proposed attack. The suggested
enhancement involves changing the structure of some of
the messages and sending the result of Xoring two random
nonces instead of transmitting the random nonce as is.
Moreover, a special case of the first protocol where the
ownership of only one T is transferred from a single Rc to
a single Rn is presented by Kapoor and Piramuthu in [18].
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However, the same windowing problem and de-synchroniza-
tion attack and their remedy which are proposed by
Bagheri et al. are also applied to the single-version protocol.
Another de-synchronization attack against Kapoor and
Piramuthu protocol [18] was reported in [72]. In this attack,
it is assumed that T updates its secret after receiving the TTP
s response. An Adv can perform this attack by simply sending
a manipulated version of the TTP s response to T in order to
lead it to update it secret differently from the TTP.
Furthermore, since the protocol in [18] is a single ver-
sion of Kapoor et al. [70] group protocol, we can state that
Kapoor et al. group protocol is also vulnerable to the attack
proposed in [72].
On a final note, as mentioned previously, Kapoor et al.’s
group OT protocol was modeled after Kapoor et al.’s protocol
which is proposed in [46]. The only difference between the
two protocols is that the group OT protocol slightly changes
the messages’ structure of the protocol proposed in [46].
However, since the two protocols work using exactly the same
procedure we conclude that the protocol in [18] suffers from
the same windowing problem and de-synchronization attack
proposed in [71] and [72].
As for the second OT protocol, it consists of five loops,
the TTP initiates the first three loops, whereas Rn initiates
the last two. The protocol starts when Rc and Rn decide to
transfer the ownership of the tags and inform the TTP about
the transfer. To demonstrate the protocol, it is assumed that
the ownership of only two tags (i.e. T1 and T2) needs to be
transferred.
After being informed about the transfer, the TTP starts
the protocol with the first loop in which it generates a new
key KTTP,Rn,T1 and send it in an encrypted form to T1. T1 in
turn extracts the new key and acknowledges the reception of
the message by re-encrypting the extracted key and sending
the result back to the TTP. After the first loop is com-
pleted successfully, the TTP initiates the second loop by
generating another new key KTTP,Rn,T2 and transmitting it
encrypted to T2 which in turn acknowledges the reception
similar to T1. Next, in the third loop, the TTP sends the new
keys (i.e. KTTP,Rn,T1 and KTTP,Rn,T2 ) to Rn. However, before
Rn acknowledges the reception of the new keys, it carries
out the next two loops in order to authenticate the two tags.
In other words, the fourth and fifth loops are nested in the
third loop. Thus, Rn initiates the fourth loop in which it
encrypts the random nonce NRn using the key KTTP,Rn,T1 and
transmits the result to T1 and waits for the acknowledgment
in order to authenticate it. Rn repeats the same procedure with
T2 in the fourth loop. However, it uses KTTP,Rn,T2 instead of
KTTP,Rn,T1 to encrypt NRn .
When Rn receives the acknowledgment from the two tags
and authenticates them, it sends the acknowledgment to the
TTP. When the TTP receives the acknowledgment from Rn,
it sends the old keys (i.e. KTTP,Rc,T1 and KTTP,Rc,T2 ) in an
encrypted form to Rc to inform it that the old keys can no
longer be used to authenticate the tags. Therefore, Rc can no
longer access the tags.
This protocol is a one-pass protocol between every pair
of entities. Although the protocol is demonstrated in a case
with only two tags, it can be extended to any number of
tags. In that case, the messages should be modified by using
the correct keys that are associated with each tag and in the
correct sequence.
Another approach for multi-tag single-owner OT was fol-
lowed by Lei et al. who proposed a protocol that supports a
novel property called independence of old owner (IOO) [73].
He et al.’s protocol can transfer the ownership of multiple tags
concurrently regardless of the old owner’s (Rc) location. The
IOO property allowsRn to update T ’s secrets without the need
for any secure environment. Thus, even if Rc can eavesdrop
on the exchanged messages between Rn and T during the
secrets update procedure, it cannot deduce the new secrets
and hence cannot violate Rn’s privacy. The main operations
employed in this protocol are simple bitwise operations,
a RNG, and hash functions.
Rc starts the OT process in which it broadcasts the
group ownership transfer request with independence of
old owner (GOTRIOO) flag and an encryption of the key
(K1)GroupT (which is shared with all tags in GroupT ) to all
tags that are within its scope. It is assumed thatGroupT whose
ownership will be transferred consist of m tags. Any T that
receives the message, checks whether it is valid or not. If the
verification succeeds, T authenticates Rc and then updates
(K1)GroupT to (K2)GroupT and its unique key (K1)T to (K2)T
and then sends the new keys encrypted to Rc. Since all m tags
participate in the protocol, they nearly send their responses at
the same time to Rc. Thus, when Rc receives a tag’s response,
it checks its validity by using the data in the BS. For each ver-
ified response, Rc confirms that the concerned T is preparing
for OT and hence it updates its record in the BS (i.e. updates
the group key and T ’s unique key). When Rc confirms that
all tags in GroupT have prepared for OT, it sends to the TTP
the updated keys (i.e. (K2)GroupT and the updated unique keys
of all participating tags) in an encrypted form and the group
ownership transfer allowance completion (GOTAC) flag.
After that, when Rn receives the tagged items, it sends
FOT to the TTP. In turn, the TTP replies with the group
ownership transfer command from TTP (GOTCTTP) flag
and an encryption of (K2)GroupT . Rn forwards the received
message to all tags within its scope. When any T receives the
message, it verifies its integrity. If the message is verified,
T confirms that Rc and the TTP have approved the OT.
Therefore, it once again updates (K2)GroupT to (K3)GroupT and
(K2)T to (K3)T and then sends the newly updated keys to Rn
which in turn forwards them to the TTP. The TTP then checks
the validity of the received messages. After verifying that all
tags have updated their keys, the TTP updates the group key
(K2)GroupT to (K3)GroupT for all tags inGroupT and the unique
key for each T individually. The TTP sends the updated keys
(i.e. (K3)GroupT and the updated unique keys of all
participating tags) to Rn which in turn employs them to
communicate with the tags.
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The main themes of the group non-EPC-compliant
TTP-based OT protocols are presented in Table 5.
TABLE 5. Main themes of non-EPC-compliant TTP-based group
OT protocols.
The non-EPC-compliant TTP-based group OT protocols
were reviewed in this section. All protocols guarantee the
old and new owner privacies. As for the windowing problem,
only one protocol [70] is vulnerable to it. Furthermore, only
one protocol [66] can offer AR. On the other hand, none of
the discussed protocols offers OD or exclusive OT and none
support mobile readers.
From the attacks perspective, only Kapoor et al.’s protocol
is susceptible to attacks, whereas the other protocols are
secure against them, to the best of our knowledge.
IV. TWO-PARTY OWNERSHIP TRANSFER PROTOCOLS
In this section, the Two-party protocols that were proposed
throughout the literature are reviewed. We start by demon-
strating the single OT protocols and then go to the group OT.
For each category, we explain the EPC-compliant protocols
first and then move over to the non-EPC-compliant proto-
cols. For each protocol, we start by a brief description of its
procedure and then we discuss its vulnerabilities.
A. TWO-PARTY SINGLE OWNERSHIP
TRANSFER PROTOCOLS
Similar to the TTP-based single OT protocols, the Two-party
single OT protocols are also classified into EPC-compliant
and non-EPC-compliant. As a quick remainder, the
EPC-compliant protocols are the protocols that meet the
requirements specified in the EPC-standard which includes
that the tags can only use simple bitwise operations, 16-bit
PRNGs and 16-bit CRC functions. In addition, the tag stores
two passwords which are the Kill and Access and the length
of the tag’s ID should be 96 bits. The non-EPC-compliant
protocols, on the other hand, do not conform to at least one
of the standard’s requirements. We start this section with
the EPC-compliant protocols and then go to the non-EPC-
compliant ones. For each protocol, we start by describing its
procedure briefly and then go over its weaknesses.
1) EPC-COMPLIANT TWO-PARTY SINGLE OWNERSHIP
TRANSFER PROTOCOLS
After Saito et al’s. Two-party protocol (Section II-D),
Ilic et al. [74] proposed a model for dual ownership trans-
fer (DOT). The proposed model demonstrates the manage-
ment process of the access to the information system (IS)
data when the tagged-items change owner in supply chains.
In DOT, if an owner proves its physical possession of a
tagged item, then it is given the right to access the item’s
data in the IS. Thus, the main idea of DOT is to connect
the physical possession of a tagged item with the IS access
control. In supply chains, there are predefined relations and
common agreements, DOT benefits from them in order to
organize the access control to the IS.
There are two key concepts for DOT; namely P1 and P2.
P1 states that if you can prove that you have physical pos-
session of the tag, then you can control it. P2 states that if
the tag’s possession is transferred to another owner, then the
access control is also transferred (this includes past, current
and future transactions). In order for Rc to access its T ’s data
in the IS, it needs to establish a DOT link to prove the physical
possession of the tag. The DOT link connects the physical
tagged-item with its data record in the IS. The proof that the
owner needs to provide includes a proof for the tagged item’s
identity (i.e. IDT ), a proof for the owner’s identity and a proof
for the timeliness of the previous two proofs.
Once the link is created, the owner can access the item’s
data. The DOT link of Rc remains established until Rn creates
a new DOT link with the item. In DOT, the most recent data
records are only accessible by Rc (i.e. the owner that has
the DOT link) and it cannot change the old data records.
In addition, the old owners can keep the read access to the
data that were valid during their ownership in case they still
need to use them.
Llic et al. did not provide a protocol to implement their
model. However, they kept the implementation as a future
work.
After that, the RFID Delegation and Ownership Transfer
protocol (RFIDDOT) was proposed by Dimitriou in [75].
RFIDDOT is based on using a PRF to encrypt the exchanged
messages. Moreover, it uses simple bitwise operations and
a RNG. After receiving the secret key KRc,T , Rn initiates the
OT process by sending an update request along with a random
nonce (N1)Rn to T . In its turn, T generatesNT and then replies
withNT andFKRc,T (NT ‖(N1)Rn ). Next,Rn generates a random
nonce (N2)Rn and then transmits it along with NT and (N1)Rn
in an encrypted form to T . Finally, both Rn and T updates the
secret key KRc,T to a new value (i.e. KRn,T ).
Nevertheless, RFIDDOT does not fulfill the requirements
of a secure OT protocol [23]. First of all, the random nonces
(N1)Rn and NT are transmitted in cleartext, thus Adv can
compute FKRc,T (NT ‖(N1)Rn ). After that it can obtain (N2)Rn
from the last message sent from Rn to T . Once Adv gets
(N2)Rn , it can obtain the new key KRn,T . From this point,
Adv can decrypt all subsequent transactions and furthermore
clone T . Another issue with this protocol is its vulnerability
to de-synchronization, which can be carried out by either
blocking the last message sent from Rn to T or by modifying
the obtained (N2)Rn to a different value and then using it to
compute the last message.
As for Kulseng et al., they proposed a Two-party OT
protocol in addition to the TTP-based one that is proposed
in [27].The Two-party protocol is based on using PUF and
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LFSR and implemented by using the proposedmutual authen-
tication protocol directly.
To start the OT, Rc gives Rn the information associated
with the concerned T . Once Rn receives the information,
it performsmutual authentication with T . Therefore,Rn sends
a request to T which in turn responds with its IDS. After
receiving T ’s IDS, Rn replies with IDT and the shared secret
key in an encrypted form. T then verifies the received mes-
sage and if found valid, it verifies Rn. Hence, T updates its
secret key and then transmits the updated key in an encrypted
form to Rn. In turn, Rn validates the received message and
then updates the secret keys. After that, both sides update
the IDS value concurrently. As a final step, Rn performs
the explained procedure once more in order to update the
secret keys to new values that are unknown to Rc. Therefore,
completing two sessions of the protocol, Rc cannot access T .
Still, the same de-synchronization and disclosure attacks
previously discussed in Section III-A1 are applicable to the
Two-party protocol.
Thus, in [33], Cui also proposed a Two-party protocol that
enhances the work of Kulseng et al. Cui’s protocol employs
the same message flow as Kulseng et al.’s protocol. However,
it modifies the structure of the exchanged messages in order
to mitigate the attacks proposed against it.
Another approach was followed by Chen and Chien in
their OT protocol for the membership-based store systems
andmobile RFID environments [76]. The tags in this protocol
employ simple bitwise operations, RNG and CRC . As for the
other entities, they use the same operations used by the tags
in addition to hashing, SKC and PKI .
This protocol consists of four stages. In stage 1, all product
tags, users’ mobile readers IDs, passwords, and fingerprints
are registered with the BS via a secure channel. As for stage
2, the users employ their mobile readers to query the tags,
the tags information can be obtained only by the readers that
are authorized by the BS. In stage 3, the current user pays
for the product through the cash register and then it obtains
the private information from the BS in order to become the
current owner Rc. Finally, in stage 4, Rc can transfer the
ownership of T to Rn, when necessary, through the proposed
OT protocol.
The proposed OT protocol is divided into five steps. Rc
starts the protocol with the first step in which it sends T ’s
privacy information to Rn via a secure channel. After that,
in step 2, Rn generates a new key for T and then sends it in an
encrypted form to the authorized agent (AA). In step 3, AA
forwards the received messages (which hides the new key)
to the BS. As for the fourth step, BS verifies the integrity of
the received messages. If the verification succeeds, the BS
updates T ’s secret key to the received new key and updates
the sold list of Rn. To finish, Rn updates the secret key of T
through a secure channel in the fifth step.
However, in [77] Munilla et al. exposed the vulnerabilities
of Chen and Chien protocol and demonstrated several attacks
against it.
To start, in the specification of Chen and Chien’s protocol,
T does not authenticate BS (or reader) and this makes the
protocol susceptible to server/reader impersonation.
Secondly, an Adv can disclose all bits of the secret key
which is shared between BS and every T and this means that
all tags in the system are compromised.
Furthermore, T in Chen and Chien’s protocol can be
tracked by twomethods. In the first one, Adv can track T after
querying it for one time only. On the other hand, in the second
method, he queries T for number of times enough to discover
the secret system parameter and then employs the disclosed
parameter to trace T .
In addition to tracking, anAdv can also impersonate T . This
impersonation attack can be carried out by two methods; the
first one allows Adv to disclose T ’s unique secret key and
then use it to impersonate it. In the second method, Adv can
impersonate T without recovering the secret key.
Munilla et al. stated that the main reason which helped in
performing the attacks is the weakness in the tag authentica-
tion process of Chen and Chien’s protocol.
We end this section with Doss et al. protocols which are
based on the quadratic residue property [78]. Doss et al.
proposed two protocols, the first protocol is for closed loop
systems in which T is reachable by both Rc and Rn during
the OT process, whereas the second is for open loop systems
where T is reachable by Rn only during the OT process.
In addition to the proposed OT protocols, the authors pro-
posed an OT test protocol which is used to ensure that the
OT process was completed successfully. The main operations
used in the proposed protocols are simple bitwise operations,
CRC , RNG and a hash function. The hash function is used by
the BS only.
In the closed loop protocol, BSRn initiates the OT by
sending FOT to T which in turn replies with its informa-
tion in an encrypted form. BSRn then generates two large
prime numbers and computes their multiplication. After that,
it transmits the multiplication result along with the informa-
tion received from T to BSRc . When BSRc receives the infor-
mation, it checks its integrity. If the verification succeeds,
BSRc retrieves the associated T ’s information that is stored in
the record (i.e. IDT ,H (IDT ), KBSRc ,T , NBSRc ) and then replies
with an acknowledgment. Upon receiving the acknowledg-
ment, T checks its validity and if verified, it confirms that
BSRc and BSRn share a secure channel and that BSRc knows
the secret KBSRc ,T .
Thus, T responds by sending itsKBSRc ,T encrypted toBSRn .
When BSRn receives T ’s response, it generates a new key
KBSRn and transmits it in an encrypted form to T . In its turn, T
verifies the received information and if found valid it extracts
the new key KBSRn and replies by sending its H (IDT ) and
NBSRc encrypted to BSRn . BSRn then extracts H (IDT )⊕NBSRc
from the received message and forwards it to BSRc . In its turn,
BSRc verifies whether the received information is valid.
If the verification succeeds, it locates the concerned T ’s
information and forwards IDT to BSRn . Therefore, BSRn
obtains the target T detailed information. After that, BSRn
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updates NBSRc to a new value and transmits it encrypted
to T . As a last step, T validates the integrity of the received
information and if the verification succeeds, it confirms that
BSRn has obtained IDT and that KBSRn is correct. Hence, T
updates its secrets to the new values. By that, the OT process
is completed and BSRc can no longer access T .
As for the open loop protocol, it works using exactly
the same procedure of the closed loop protocol. The only
difference here is that BSRc sends the acknowledgment (in
the fourth flow) to BSRn via secure channel. After that, BSRn
encrypts the received acknowledgment and then forwards
it to T . The purpose of encrypting the acknowledgment is
to prove to T that there is a secure channel between BSRc
and BSRn .
As mentioned previously, the authors proposed and own-
ership test protocol. This protocol is based on the quadratic
residue property and is launched after the OT process has
completed in order to allow an owner to verify whether it
has ownership over the concerned T . This protocol is carried
out in a virtual environment where there are no adversaries.
The owner initiates the test protocol by sending an ownership
test message to the target T which in turn replies by sending
its information in an encrypted form. The owner validates
the received information and if the verification succeeds,
it confirms its ownership over T . Therefore, it replies with
an encryption of H (IDT ). As a final step, T verifies whether
the received information is valid. If so, this confirms that it is
owned by a valid owner.
Doss et al. stated that because of the quadratic residue
property, completing the OT test protocol successfully pro-
vides a sufficient condition to prove the owner’s exclusive
ownership over the tag.
Nevertheless, Cao et al. [42] revealed the weaknesses
of Doss et al.’s protocols. The authors demonstrated that
Doss et al.’s closed loop protocol suffers from reader imper-
sonation and de-synchronization attacks, whereas the open
loop protocol is vulnerable to de-synchronization, tracking,
and impersonation attacks (reader and tag). The authors stated
that the main reason which helped in performing the attacks is
that these protocols do not verify the integrity of each received
message. This gives the adversaries the chance to manipulate
the exchanged messages and replay them.
Moreover, in order to prevent tag tracking, reader imper-
sonation and de-synchronization attacks, the authors sug-
gested that the protocol should be modified by sending the
multiplication result of p and q in an encrypted from to Rc
instead of sending it in cleartext.
As a final note, the authors pointed out that Doss et al.’s
open loop protocol does not guarantee old owner privacy
because Rc transmits IDT to Rn who in turn can employ it
to trace T ’s historical information.
Table 6 shows the main themes of the EPC-compliant
Two-party single OT protocols.
From the discussion in this section, we see that all protocols
achieve resistance against the windowing problem. However,
only two protocols can guarantee both the old and new
TABLE 6. Main themes of EPC-compliant two-party single OT protocols.
owner privacies. As for OD or AR and supporting mobile
readers, only one protocol [75] can provide just OD and two
protocols can offer the latter. Moreover, none of the presented
protocols provides exclusive OT.
Based on the reviewed literature, only one protocol
(Cui’s protocol [33]) can resist the discussed attacks.
2) NON-EPC-COMPLIANT TWO-PARTY SINGLE
OWNERSHIP TRANSFER PROTOCOLS
The first non-ECP-Compliant Two-party single OT protocol
was proposed by Koralalage et al. in [79]. The proposed
protocol is called the product-flow ownership-transferring
protocol (POP) and can perform several functions such as
querying the tags, disabling them and updating their secret
keys.
POP informs T about the required function by using the
update flag FU . The main operations employed in POP are
RNG and SKC which is implemented through Grain stream
cipher [60]. Rn initiates the process by sending IDE(Rn)
and NRn encrypted to T which in turn verifies whether the
received information is valid. If the verification succeeds,
it generates a random nonce NT and sends it in an encrypted
form along IDE(Rn) to Rn. When Rn receives the message,
it employs it to authenticate T . Once T is authenticated, Rn
can access it and perform the needed function. For OT pur-
poses, Rn changes the shared keys (K1)Rn,T and (K2)Rn,T and
then transmits them encrypted to T . As an acknowledgment,
T replies by sending a confirmation message to indicate the
success or failure of the process.
Yet, as demonstrated in [18], an Adv can trace T by con-
tinuously replaying the first message in the protocol to it.
Since each tag response contains IDE(Rn) in cleartext, Adv
can use this value to trace T . Also, the authors stated that
it is unknown what will happen in case Adv blocks the last
message sent from Rn to T , or vice versa. Because this
act leads to a situation where Rn has updated (K1)Rn,T and
(K2)Rn,T , whereas T has not.
Song [80] proposed a protocol that uses hashing instead of
SKC to encrypt themessages. In fact, Song’s protocol is based
on Song and Mitchell’s authentication protocol (denoted by
SM) which is proposed in [81]. In addition to SKC , the pro-
tocol employs other operations such as simple bitwise opera-
tions and RNG.
This protocol begins with the OT sub-protocol and then
goes to the update sub-protocol. The OT sub-protocol is
initiated by BSRn which queries T with a random nonce
(NBSRn ). T in turn replies by generating a random nonce
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NT and then sends it along with the secret key KRc,T in an
encrypted form (through messages M1 = KRc,T ⊕ NT and
M2 = HKRc,T (NBSRn⊕NT )) to BSRn . Next, BSRn forwards the
received information along with NBSRn and FOT to BSRc .
Once BSRc receives the message, it checks its validity and
if the verification succeeds it updates the received NT value
and then re-encrypts the result using its secret key KBSRc .
After that, BSRc updates the old and current values of KRc and
KRc,T and then transfers them along with Info(IDT ) and the
re-encrypted NT to BSRn via a secure channel. In turn, BSRn
stores the received secrets and Info(IDT ) and forwards the re-
encrypted NT to T . Finally, when T receives the message,
it checks whether it is valid or not. If the received message is
found to be valid, T authenticates BSRn and updates the secret
key KRc,T .
After the aforementioned steps are accomplished, Rn
becomes the new owner of T . However, it still needs to update
the secrets to new values that are unknown to Rc in order
to preserve its privacy. Thus, Rn performs the update-sub
protocol with T in an environment that is isolated from Rc.
BSRn starts this session by generating two random nonces
(N1)BSRn and (N2)BSRn and a new key (i.e. KRn ). After that,
BSRn transmits KRn , and KRc encrypted to T along with
(N1)BSRn . T in turn verifies the received information and then
it updates KRc,T to KRn and generates a random nonce NT .
Next, T encrypts (N1)BSRn and NT with the key KRn and sends
the result along with NT to BSRn .
As a last step, BSRn verifies the integrity of the received
message and if the verification succeeds, it confirms that T
has updated its secret. Thus, BSRn updates KRc,T to KRn and
KRc to a new value.
It should be noted that both BSRc and BSRn can keep a
record of the old secrets (which were given to Rn by Rc) such
that Rn can allow Rc to access T again when necessary.
Song’s protocol is susceptible to de-synchronization attack
as shown in [23]. The de-synchronization happens when Adv
blocks the last message sent from Rn to T during the OT sub-
protocol. In addition to de-synchronization, the authors noted
thatAdv can impersonate T by storingNBSRn ,M1 andM2 from
a session in the OT sub-protocol. After that, when BSRn sends
a new random nonce (for example (N2)BSRn ), Adv replies by
sending M1 ⊕ NBSRn ⊕ (N2)BSRn .
Moreover, in [82] Peris-Lopez et al. revealed more vul-
nerabilities of Song’s protocol. The authors proved that the
OT sub-protocol suffers from tag information leakage and
tracking attacks and is susceptible to forward traceability.
They also showed that the secret update sub-protocol does
not resist de-synchronization attack.
Following after Song, another approach that is based on the
SM protocol was proposed by Song and Mitchell in [83]. The
proposed protocol employs simple bitwise operations, RNG
and hash chains. In their work, Song and Mitchell focused
on the scalability aspect. Therefore, the proposed protocol
makes sure that the tag can be identified and authenticated
within a constant time (i.e. no linear search) through the use of
a pre-computed lookup table. In fact, the server needs O(1)
work to identify and authenticate the tag.
The working procedure of this protocol is divided into
three cases; tag authentication, secret update (I) and secret
update (II). The tag authentication case is initiated by BSRc
which queries T with a random nonce. Each time T is queried,
it checks whether its secret KT is equal to the last element
in the chain (which is stored in its memory). If both values
do not match, T updates KT to the next element in the chain,
encrypts (KT )old usingKBSRc ,T and then sends the result along
with the updated secret (i.e. (KT )new) to BSRc . BSRc in turn
employs the received information and its lookup table in order
to identify and authenticate T . Searching the lookup table
requires a constant time (i.e. O(1)). The protocol works this
way for the first w− 1 queries of T (where w is the length of
the hash chain).
After the number of queries reaches w, the protocol goes to
the secret update (I) case. In this case,BSRc works on updating
T ’s secrets and itself. Therefore, it updates T ’s secrets and
then sends them in an encrypted form to T and then updates
its own secrets. Upon receiving the message, T checks its
integrity and if found valid, it updates its secrets accordingly.
One additional message is required for this case. However,
the time complexity for T ’s authentication is the same as that
in the first case (i.e. O(1)).
As for the third case, it is performed when the number of
queries exceeds w times which is an abnormal situation (i.e.
either BSRc or T or both did not update their secrets suc-
cessfully during the second case). In this case, T generates
a random nonce and uses it to encrypt KT and then sends
the result to BSRc . In its turn, BSRc performs a linear search
with complexity O(n) in order to validate the received T ’s
secret. If T ’s secret matches the first element in the chain,
BSRc employs its old secrets to perform the update process.
On the other hand, if T ’s secret matches the last element in
the chain, BSRc carries out the update process using the newly
generated secrets.
To perform the OT, BSRc transfers the secrets and any
needed information to BSRn via a secure channel (after updat-
ing the secrets for T as mentioned previously). After that,
BSRn updates T ’s secrets once more in order to protect its
privacy fromBSRc using the same protocol (this update should
be performed outside the eavesdropping range of BSRc ).
Song and Mitchell further revised their work as shown
in [84]. In the revised version they only changed the struc-
ture of the message that is sent from BSRc to T so that it
computes the hash of two values instead of three. Moreover,
they proposed another protocol that can be used by BSRn
to update T ’s state after completing the OT protocol. Com-
pared with the work in [83], the newly proposed protocol
requires fewer cryptographic functions’ computation on T ’s
side and fewer exchanged messages between BSRn and T .
Therefore, the authors stated that BSRn should update T ’s
secrets using the new protocol instead of the OT protocol in
order to improve the performance. This enhancement can be
VOLUME 6, 2018 32139
E. Taqieddin et al.: Tag OT in RFID Systems: Survey of Existing Protocols and Open Challenges
achieved assuming that BSRn knows the identity of the newly
obtained T .
However, in [85] Habibi and Aref revealed the weak-
nesses of Song and Mitchell’s revised OT protocol in which
they launched de-synchronization, traceability and backward
traceability attacks.
The authors stated that the main reason for the
de-synchronization attack is a flaw in the OT update mech-
anism; the flaw is that BS updates the secrets and then
forwards them encapsulated in a message to T via an insecure
channel. This procedure gives Adv the chance to manipulate
this message in the secret update (I) and secret update (II)
cases, thus they can lead T to update its secrets to different
values than BS. The manipulation of the message is based on
representing the length of the employed hash function output
which is equal to l1‖l2‖l3 where l1 is the first l-bits of the hash
function’s output, l2 is the second l-bits of the hash function’s
output, and l3 is the last lm-bits of the hash function’s output.
As for the traceability attack, it depends on the nature
of the messages’ flow in the protocol’s cases. In the tag
authentication case there are two flows; the first one is from
BS to T , whereas the second one is the reply which is sent
in the reverse direction. On the other hand, in the secret
update (I) and secret update (II) cases there is an additional
flow from BS to T in order to perform the update. Using
this fact, the adversaries can trace T . Finally, the backward
traceability attack can be carried out because the key’s value
at T ’s side is updated by using a hash chain of length wwhich
also limits the number of authentication sessions. Therefore,
compromising T during the authentication stage, allows Adv
to trace all previously executed sessions within this stage.
As discussed previously, Song and Mitchell’s protocol
in [84] is a revised version of their protocol proposed
in [83] and the only difference is that the revised pro-
tocol computes the hash of two values instead of three.
Moreover, the de-synchronization attack that is proposed by
Habibi and Aref [85] depends on the flow of the update mech-
anism and the representation of length of the hash function’s
output. Thus, we can state that the same de-synchronization
attack applies to Song and Mitchell’s protocol which pro-
posed in [83] because it employs the same update mecha-
nism’s flow and computing the hash of two values does not
change the length of the hash function’s output.
Following the same principle, we can state that the proto-
col in [83] suffers from the same traceability and backward
traceability attacks since this protocol and the revised version
have the same nature of the messages’ flow in the protocol’s
cases as well as having an identical authentication. Further-
more, any vulnerability reported against Song and Mitchell’s
revised protocol in Section VII is also applied to the
protocol in [83].
To resist the proposed de-synchronization and traceability
attacks, the authors modified Song and Mitchell’s OT pro-
tocol by proposing a new update mechanism where both BS
and T participate in the update procedure and by using three
flows in all protocol stages.
The proposed update mechanism involves two update
states. The first one is used when both BS and T are in a
synchronized state. Thus, in this update state both the old
and current keys are updated. As for the second state, it is
employed when both parties are in de-synchronized state,
hence only the current key is updated. This procedure is
followed so that BS can synchronize T again. By using this
two-state update mechanism, Habibi and Aref’s protocol
can resist the de-synchronization attack that is launched
against Song and Mitchell’s protocol. Also, because both
cases employ three flows, Adv cannot trace T .
Furthermore, in [86] Wang and Yuan proposed the
lightweight scalable de-synchronizing attack-resistant pro-
tocol (LSDARP) which is considered an improvement over
Song and Mitchell’s protocol. LSDARP employs a sliding
window mechanism on hash chains in order to reduce the
storage at the server’s side and to enhance the scalability and
performance. Each time the secret update phase in LSDARP
is completed successfully, the window slides forward for one
step only. Therefore in this protocol, BS needs to store only
the two consecutive hash values (eigenvalues) for the tag’s old
and new hash chains in order to carry out the authentication
process. On the other hand, Song and Mitchell’s protocol
stores all values in the hash chain which requiresmore storage
space.
Because BS in LSDARP stores only the two consecutive
old and new eigenvalues, the search complexity for a matched
entry is O(1). In addition, this protocol does not need to a
keep a record of every possible used eigenvalue or a counter
to determine its offset. This helps in avoiding the complexity
degeneration problem that happens when all eigenvalues are
used up. Moreover, T does not need a counter to perform the
authentication phase.
LSDARP is initiated by BS which queries T with a random
nonce. T in turn replies with its secrets in an encrypted form.
After that, BS tries to authenticate the received messages by
searching for a matched value in the new eigenvalues’ set and
if the authentication succeeds, it updates its secrets, moves the
window one step, and then transmits the updated secrets in an
encrypted form to T . Otherwise, it performs the search in the
old eigenvalues’s set and if such a value is found, it sends its
current secrets (i.e. does not perform the update) encrypted to
T . On the other hand, if no matched value is found in either
of the two sets, the authentication results in failure. As for T ,
once it receives BS’s response, it checks the integrity of the
received messages and if found valid, it updates its secrets.
It should be noted that the update step atBS’s side is always
one step behind that at T ’s side in order to resynchronize T
in case a de-synchronization has occurred.
After LSDARP is finished successfully, T ’s secrets are
updated to new values that are unknown to Rc.
Chen et al. [87] showed that T in LSDARP can be tracked.
Thus, they improve the protocol to LSDARP+ in order
to resist the tracking attack. The proposed improvement in
LSDARP+ involves the following: changing the messages’
structure, allowing T to generate a random nonce and using
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it along with the random nonce that is generated by BS to
encrypt T ’s output and updating its keys and adding one of
the messages that is sent by T to the validation message.
As for Ahamed et al. [48], they proposed another
Two-party protocol that is based on hashing. In addition to
hash functions, this protocol employs simple bitwise oper-
ations and RNG. The protocol follows the same procedure
used in YA-SRAP. However, in this protocol Rc sends T ’s
information to Rn instead of the TTP and then removes the
information from its list. The authors pointed out that the
Two-party approach is preferable since there is no need to
communicate with the TTP each time there is an OT. More-
over, the authors noted that each reader has a threshold that
limits the maximum amount of T ’s ownership information
that it can hold. Thus, if a reader exceeds this limit it becomes
overloaded.
In order to relive the overloaded reader, some of T ’s
information can be transferred to a nearby co-operative
(non-malicious) reader by using the Two-party OT
approach. This procedure helps in ensuring the scalability
of the proposed protocol. However, this OT approach has
the same vulnerabilities of the YA-SRAP that are discussed
in Section III-A2.
Another server-less OT protocol that employs simple
bitwise operations, RNG and hashing was proposed by
Xei et al. in [49]. The proposed protocol is named tag-
owner-assisting RFID authentication protocol toward access
control and ownership transfer (TOA). As the name implies,
TOA is an OT protocol that is based on a novel tag-owner-
assisting architecture in which the tag’s owner has a main
role in the authentication process. The main feature of the
proposed protocol is that it provides OT, access-control, and
mutual authentication without any need for a BS. Thus,
TOA is a server-less approach that supports OT in offline
environments.
Moreover, this protocol offers additional important charac-
teristics such as simplicity, untraceability, scalability, access
controllability and device-independence which is a novel
contribution by the authors. Access controllability aims to
control the access to the reader in order to ensure that
no adversaries can access it, whereas device independence
means that even if themobile reader is missing, the authorized
owner can still authenticate the tags and transfer their own-
ership through the use of any unified reader without online
initialization.
To start the OT in TOA, Rc and Rn enter their passwords
PWRc andPWRn into the trusted system readerR; respectively.
As a result, R generates a random nonce NR and transmits it
to T which in turn replies by sending PWRc (that is stored in
its memory) in an encrypted form by using its key KT and
the random nonce NT . After that, R checks the integrity of
the received information and if found valid, it sends PWRn
encrypted to T . In turn, T tries to validate the received mes-
sages. If the verification results in a success, it confirms that
PWRn is authentic and that R obtains the correct values of
PWRc and KT which means that it is trusted and authorized
by Rc and Rn. Thus, T updates its own version of PWRc to
the received PWRn . Finally, Rn repeats the previous steps -by
using its private reader- to update the password in T to a new
value (i.e. (PWRn )
new). This update procedure is carried out
in a secure environment that Rc cannot access or eavesdrop
on. After the OT is completed successfully, Rc can no longer
access T .
A hash-based OT approach was also proposed by
Jin et al. in [47]. The protocol is called the Hash-Based
Ownership Transfer Protocol for RFID Tags (HBOT). This
protocol utilizes simple bitwise operations and a RNG in
addition to hash functions. As for the OT, it is initiated by
Rn which sends a query request to T . When T receives the
request, it generates a random number NT and then sends
it encrypted using key KRc,T to Rn. Next, Rn forwards the
received information to BSRn which in turn retransmits it to
BSRc through a secure channel. Upon receiving the messages,
BSRc verifies their integrity by using the current secret values.
If the validation succeeds, it authenticates T and then sends
KRc , KRc,T , and Info(IDT ) to BSRn -through a secure channel-
so that it obtain the ownership of T . On the other hand, if the
verification fails, BSRc performs one of two options which
depend on either the security or the efficiency.
For better security,BSRc terminates the sessionwith failure.
Otherwise (i.e. for efficiency purposes), it tries to verify
the received information using the old secret value. If the
verification succeeds, it transmits (KRc )
old , (KRc,T )
old and
Info(IDT ) to BSRn . Else, BSRc terminates the protocol session
with failure. However, in all cases (i.e. either successful
authentication or failure), BSRc updates the old and current
secrets.
After receiving the messages, BSRn generates new keys
(K1)BSRn and (K2)BSRn . Then, it sends (K2)BSRn in an
encrypted form to Rn. After that, BSRn updates the old and
current secrets. In turn, Rn forwards the received messages
to T . As a last step, T checks the validity of the received
messages and if found valid, it updates its key to (K2)BSRn .
Furthermore in [88], Fernandez-Mir et al. proposed a hash-
based OT protocol that ensures scalability even with the
increasing number of tags. The main idea in their protocol is
to update the identification key immediately after T has been
identified. This idea is employed in the OT procedure in order
to update the owner’s key. Moreover, the proposed protocol
depends on the synchronization between BS and T and is
designed in away to prevent the adversaries from determining
whether T is synchronized or not. Thus, even if BS and T
become de-synchronized, the protocol is still scalable and
resistant to de-synchronization attacks.
Assuming that BSRc and T are in a synchronized state, Rc
starts the protocol by sending a random nonce NRc to T . T
in turn replies with a random nonce NT and an encryption
for the identification key (K1)Rc,T . After that, T switches to
the de-synchronized state (by setting the flag SYNC to 0)
and remains in it until the key update process terminates
successfully. Rc then forwards the received messages along
with NRc to BSRc . Upon receiving the messages, BSRc checks
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their validity and if verified, it sends IDT to Rc and records
NRc and NT . Next, BSRc starts the key update process by
updating (K1)Rc,T to ((K1)Rc,T )
new and then sends the updated
key in an encrypted form to T . In turn, T verifies the received
message and if found valid, it updates its key to the received
((K1)Rc,T )
new and sets SYNC to 1.
Finally, Rc can transfer T ’s ownership to Rn through updat-
ing its and T ’s key (K2)Rc,T to ((K2)Rc,T )
new -to protect its
privacy- and then forwarding ((K2)Rc,T )
new to Rn. Rc employs
the same updating procedure that is used to update the key
(K1)Rc,T . Rn in turn updates ((K2)Rc,T )
new to a new value
in order to protect its privacy by using the same procedure.
Rn should perform this key update in a secure environment in
which Rc cannot eavesdrop on the exchanged messages.
Following the same approach, Dimitriou proposed another
Two-party OT protocol in [89].The protocol employs a key-
evolving mechanism to update the tag’s key, this mech-
anism allows direct transfer of ownership between the
owners.
Key-evolving means that Rc updates its key to a temporary
key and then forwards the temporary key to Rn in order to
protect its privacy. After that, Rn updates the received key to
a new value. Rn can repeat the update procedure several times
in order to ensure that Rc can never obtain the new key.
As a matter of fact, this protocol employs the same struc-
ture and messages of the RFIDDOT protocol which was pro-
posed in [75] and discussed in Section IV-A1. However, here
Dimitriou employs a hash function to encrypt the exchanged
messages instead of a PRF .
As reported in [90], Dimitriou’s protocol does not provide
full mutual authentication which makes the protocol suscep-
tible to reader impersonation, replay, and disclosure attacks.
Moreover, it was shown that Dimitriou’s protocol violates the
old and new owner privacies.
Moreover, in [91], Munilla et al. proposed another OT
that employs hashing and PRF . The main difference between
Munilla et al.’s protocol and the previously discussed proto-
cols is that the former is a Two-party protocol that does not
need an isolated environment in order to complete the OT.
In order to implement such a protocol, the authors proposed
a communication model that can handle spatio-temporal con-
nectivity (i.e. the current and new owners can be at different
physical locations) and used Wyner’s wiretap channel [92]
with noisy tags in order to achieve privacy without an isolated
environment.
Noisy tags are reader-controlled interferers and it is
assumed that any tag can be used as a noisy tag. Combining
wiretap channels with noisy tags produces channels with
positive secrecy capacity upon which the protocol is based.
Using these channels, Rn and T can exchange the new key
securely even if Rc eavesdrops on the exchange process.
Also, the proposed OT protocol supports the follow-
ing features: secure tag singulation, interrogator-talks-first
(i.e. the reader initiates the communication) and tag assurance
(confirming that T ’s information that is given to Rn matches
its counterpart at T ’s side).
Rc starts the OT process by forwarding IDT and Info(IDT )
to Rn via a secure channel. After that, Rc broadcasts query
messages in a continuous fashion to detect the surrounding
tags. When a certain T receives the query, it responds by
generating a random nonce (N1)T and then sending it along
with its encrypted key to Rc. Next, Rc tries to authenticate the
received response and if found valid, it singulates T . Next, Rc
encrypts the received (N1)T and then transmits it along with
NRc , IDE(Rc), IDE(Rn) and FOT to T .
Once T receives the messages, it employs the received
messages to authenticate Rc. If the authentication succeeds,
T calculates the key (K1)T = H(N1)T (NRc‖KRc,T ), stores
[IDE(Rn), (K1)T ] until the termination of the protocol or the
reception of a new command from Rc, and then it sends the
key KRc,T in an encrypted form to Rc as an acknowledg-
ment. If Rc receives T ’s reply, it computes the key KRc =
H(N1)T (NRc‖KRc,T ) and then sends it along with the mes-
sage (IDT is ready) through a secure channel to Rn as a
confirmation that T is ready for the transfer.
If Rn receives the confirmation form Rc, then it is
ready to obtain T ’s ownership. Thus, R2 calculates KRn =
HKRc (Info(IDT )) and continuously broadcasts query mes-
sages. Once T receives the query message, it computes
(K2)T = H(K1)T (Info(IDT )) and then generates (N2)T and
sends it along with the encrypted (K2)T to Rn. After receiving
the message, if Rn succeeds in singulating T , it replies by
generating a random nonce (N1)Rn and sending it along with
HKRn ((N2)T ).
T , in turn, employs the received message to authenti-
cate Rn. If Rn is verified, T updates the stored values
[IDE(Rc),KRc,T which specifies T ’s ownership rights to
[IDE(Rn), (K2)T ] and then sends (K2)T encrypted to Rn as an
acknowledgment. Otherwise, it uses the message to authenti-
cate Rc. If Rc is authenticated, T waits for a new command.
Other than that, T does not respond.
When Rn receives T ’s acknowledgment, it performs the
key update protocol to ensure that Rc can no longer access T .
The Key update protocol is performed to privately update
T ’s key from (K2)T to the new valueKRn,T which is generated
by Rn. The entities involved in this protocol are Rn, T , and nT
noisy tags T ∗t , where 1 ≤ t ≤ nT . It is assumed that Rn and
T ∗t share the private key KRn,T ∗t .
Rn initiates the key update protocol by generating (N2)Rn
and then broadcasts it alongwith a key change request (KCR).
When T and T ∗t receive the messages, they generate (N3)T
and {KT ∗t }nTt=1 respectively and then broadcasts them simul-
taneously. Where {KT ∗t } = H∗(N2)Rn (KRn,T ∗t ) and H∗ is a
cryptographic hash function that can be constructed from
function H .
Upon receiving (N3)T and {KT ∗t }nTt=1, Rn extract (N3)T ,
calculates KRn,T = H(N2)Rn ((N3)T ‖KRn ) and then broad-
casts H(N3)T (KRn,T ). T then calculates its own version of
as KRn,T = H(N2)Rn ((N3)T ‖(K2)T ) and uses it to verify the
integrity of received message. If the verification succeeds,
it updates (K2)T to KRn,T and then it sends H(N2)Rn (KRn,T ) to
Rn as an acknowledgment.
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Once Rn receives the message, it checks its integrity. If the
received message is valid, then the key update protocol is
completed successfully and Rn informs Rc. Otherwise, Rn
transmits a query to T to check whether it has updated its key.
If this in not the case, the key update protocol is repeated.
Ng et al. [93] tried a different approach in which they pro-
posed a protocol that is based on PKI and hashing in. In their
protocol, the authors took into consideration the importance
of fulfilling the privacy needs for all parties involved in the
OT process (i.e. the company, the buyer (who may become
Rn at some point), Ro and Rc). The proposed protocol has
countermeasures that will be performed in order to protect
the buyer in case the seller (Rc) was found to be a fraud and
to protect Ro or Rc in case one of them has tricked the other.
Therefore, the authors proposed four new security properties
which are supported by their protocol:
• Tag assurance: a property that allows the buyer to con-
firm that T , whose ownership will be transferred, is the
intended one.
• Current ownership proof: a property that allows Rc to
prove its ownership of the tag to any third party.
• Undeniable ownership transfer: a property that allowsRc
to prove to any third party that T was owned by Ro (i.e.
Ro cannot deny owning T previously).
• Ownership initiation: a property to ensure that the OT
and the key change can be initiated by Rc only.
In addition to PKI and hashing, the proposed protocol uses
other operations such as simple bitwise operations, RNG and
the Auth protocol which is used to authenticate T ’s response.
This protocol outputs true, if and only if, T ’s response
matches the value that is computed by the reader using the
T ’s secret. Otherwise, it outputs false for an authentication
failure.
Before carrying out the OT process, the authors assume
that the target T should have been authenticated and thus
Rc has obtained the necessary information about T (i.e. IDT ,
Info(IDT ) and KRc,T ). Also, Rc’s signature should have been
stored in T ’s memory because this signature will be used
to achieve the current ownership and undeniable ownership
transfer properties. After that, Rc forwards IDT and Info(IDT )
to the buyer. Moreover, Rc and the buyer exchange their
public keys such that each one of them can verify the public
key through the PKI system.
The OT protocol is be initiated by Rc which starts by
changing the key KRc,T to a new value in order to protect its
privacy and leads T to do the same. After that, Rc generates
a new key KRc,buyer = H (NRc ⊕ KRc,T ) and forwards it
in an encrypted form to the buyer. Moreover, Rc makes T
update its KRc,T again and changes its maximum number
of accesses (Cntmax) to 1 so that the buyer can use the key
KRc,buyer to authenticate T for one time only (after that the
key expires).
In turn, the buyer runs the Auth protocol with the key
KRc,buyer in order to confirm that Rc knows the current T ’s
key (i.e. confirm the legitimacy of the tag’s current owner)
and that T will give a valid response to the current key
(i.e. confirms the legitimacy of the tag). Therefore, the buyer
sends a query to T and waits for the response. When the
buyer receives the response, it uses Auth(KRc,buyer ) to authen-
ticate T . Next, T executes Auth(KRc,T ) to authenticate the
buyer and then checks whether Cnt < Cntmax so that Cnt is
incremented by 1. Otherwise, it resets KRc,T to the old value.
After that, Rc encrypts its signature and key KRc and sends
the result along with the Transfer Start (TS) command to T
in order to initiate the transfer process. Only Rc can starts the
OT process because of the proposed owner initiation property.
Upon receiving the information, T verifies its legitimacy and
if verified, it responds by broadcasting its secret (K1)T to both
Rc and the buyer. Rc in turn computes H ((K1)T ) and broad-
casts the result along with the Tag Assurance (TA) command
to the buyer. When the buyer receives the information, he
checks whether it is valid. If verification results in a success,
he confirms that the seller is indeed the owner and that T is
the targeted one. Otherwise, the buyer may assume that T is
not the correct one. Either way he may choose to quit the
OT process.
However, if the verification succeeded and the buyer
decided to continue the OT to become the new owner (Rn),
he computes his signature for H ((K1)T ) and broadcasts it
along with the Buyer Signature Verification (VR) command.
The tag records the signature and Rc works on validating its
integrity. If the verification does not succeed, the protocol
is terminated. The authors stated that in real life, the buyer
should not give Rc the payment during this step of the pro-
tocol. This remark is reasonable because Rc may forfeit and
choose not complete the protocol. In such a case, the buyer
will not able to access T .
If Rc does forfeit, it generates a new key (KRc,buyer )
new and
then broadcast it along with its signature and the Transfer
End (TE) command to T and the buyer. In turn, T val-
idates the received information and if verified, it updates
(K1)T to H ((K1)T ) and then updates (K2)T using the received
(KRc,buyer )
new and the signature of the buyer. As for the buyer,
he needs to verify the received Rc’s signature (this achieves
the undeniable ownership transfer property). If the signature
is authentic, the buyer now becomesRn and knows the current
T ’s key and the signature of Rc. Thus, he proceeds with the
payment.
Finally, to complete the OT, Rn should change the current
T ’s key again to protect its privacy. The authors stated that Rn
should perform this update in a secure environment where Rc
cannot eavesdrop on the exchanged messages.
Elkhiyaoui et al. [94] proposed an OT protocol that
employs PKI and hashing. The protocol is called the RFID
Ownership Transfer with Issuer Verification (ROTIV). As the
name implies, ROTIV supports OT and allows the owners to
verify that tags were issued by a trusted party (i.e. issuer).
The main idea for achieving issuer verification in this pro-
tocol is based on storing the issuer’s signature in the tag
in an encrypted form using El-gamal ciphertext. Moreover,
ROTIV provides mutual authentication between the differ-
ent parties. In order to perform constant authentication and
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issuer verification, this protocol combines an HMAC-based
authentication with PKI and employs RNG, key update, and
tag re-encryption techniques. In addition to these techniques,
ROTIV participates in subgroups of elliptic curve that sup-
ports bilinear pairings.
The OT process in ROTIV is initiated by Rn which queries
T with the random nonce NRn . Once (N1)Rn is received,
T replies by sending its El-gamal ciphertext CT , a random
nonceNT , and anHMAC encryptionHKRc,T ((N1)Rn‖NT ‖CT ).
When Rn receives the messages, it generates another random
nonce (N2)Rn and then sends it in an encrypted form along
with the received messages to Rc. Next, Rc authenticates T
through the proposed hash-based mutual authentication pro-
tocol. If the authentication succeeds, both parties update their
state. After that, Rc sends the ownership references (which
contain the old and new values of the key KRc,T ) and the
verification references (which contain T ’s identifier) to Rn.
In turn, Rn employs the received ownership references to
verify the integrity of the received HKRc,T ((N1)Rn‖NT ‖CT ).
If the verification succeeds, Rn confirms that the received
KRc,T is associated with T . After that, Rn uses the received
verification references to authenticate the issuer using the
proposed issuer verification protocol. The issuer verification
protocol aims to validate the integrity of the issuer signature
and the El-gamal ciphertext. If the issuer is valid, Rn adds an
entry for T in its database BSRn and by that the authentication
of T is completed. Next, Rn generates a new random nonce
and uses it to calculate a new El-gamal ciphertext CRn . After
that, Rn transmits CRn and HKRc,T (NT ‖CRn ) to T and then
updates the record in BSRn which involves updating the key
KRc,T to a new value. As a last step, when T receives the
message, it checks whether Rn is authentic. If the verification
succeeds, T updates its state and key and by that the OT is
completed.
It should be noted that the authors of ROTIV state that
their protocol provides exclusive OT property. Exclusive OT
in their definition indicates that an Adv who does not hold
the ownership references of T cannot transfer T ’s ownership
unless he rewrites its content. However; since their defi-
nition differs from the general definition of exclusive OT
which is employed in this survey and previously clarified
in Section II-A, we consider that ROTIV does not provide
exclusive OT and reflect that in Table 10 when comparing
the properties of the protocols in Section VII.
Nevertheless, in [26], Abyaneh exposed the vulnerabilities
of ROTIV. The author showed that T can be traced passively
by Ro or actively by Adv who can tamper it. Moreover,
it should be noted that because the state updating in ROTIV
does not depend on the previous values, the owner can trace
the tag in the past or the future which violates the old and new
owner privacy.
Another Two-party mutual authentication and OT proto-
col which utilizes PKI and hashing was also proposed by
Yang et al. in [95]. In addition to the protocol, the authors pro-
posed a privacy model for strong adversaries. In their adver-
sarial model, the adversaries can learn all secret information
in the reader, authenticate and corrupt tags, observe the full
OT procedure, and eventually transfer the tag’s ownership to
others. Adv’s main aim in the proposed model is to be able
to differentiate the target tag from other tags. The authors
showed that their OT protocol is secure under the proposed
model and does not require the extra process in which Rn
communicates with T to perform the key update in an isolated
environment where there is no eavesdropping.
Before starting the OT protocol, the owners should authen-
ticate each other and prepare a secure channel so that Rc can
send (KRc,T )
old , (KRc,T )
new, and other tag-related information
to Rn.
After thatRn initiates the protocol by transmitting its public
key PKRn , a random nonce NRn and the access command
change to T . Then, T generates a random nonce NT , encrypts
NT along NRn and KRc,T by using PKRn and then encrypts
the result with PKRc and sends it to Rc. When Rc receives
the message, it decrypts it using SKRc and then forwards the
result to Rn.
Once the message is received by Rn, it decrypts it to extract
KRc,T ,NRn andNT . After that,Rn checks whether the received
NRn is valid and if the verification succeeds, it checks whether
KRc,T matcheswith (KRc,T )
new or (KRc,T )
old . IfKRc,T matches
(KRc,T )
new, Rn updates both (KRc,T )
old and (KRc,T )
new.
Otherwise, only (KRc,T )
new is updated. After that, Rn calcu-
lates H (NT ) and transmits the result to T .
Finally, T checks the integrity of the received message and
if found authentic, it changesPKRc toPKRn and updatesKRc,T
to KT = H (NT ‖KRc,T ) to complete the OT procedure.
We wrap this section up with the Secure Ownership
Transfer Protocol (SOTP) which was proposed by Yang and
Hu [96]. SOTP utilizes LE , SKC , simple bitwise operations,
and RNG. This protocol is designed for mobile RFID systems
and provides the ability to assign the transfer target and to
transfer the ownership across different authorities. In addition
to OT, the protocol performs mutual authentication between
the different parties. The mutual authentication is imple-
mented through secure authentication protocols such as Ker-
beros and PKI . In fact, SOTP follows a structure similar to
that of LOTP which was proposed by Yang in [8]. However,
LOTP is TTP-based whereas SOTP is not.
In addition to performing the OT across different authori-
ties, SOTP can also carry out the OT under the same authority.
However, the main focus of this protocol is the OT across dif-
ferent authorities, thus the protocol is demonstrated assuming
that Rc who is under the authority of BSRc will transfer the
ownership of T to Rn who is under the authority of BSRn .
Rc initiates the process by sending FOT to T which replies
with its information in an encrypted form. After that, Rc
re-encrypts the received information and forwards the result
to BSRc . Upon receiving the message, BSRc verifies whether
T is authentic. If the tag is authenticated, the next step of the
protocol is performed. Otherwise, the protocol is aborted.
After T has been authenticated, BSRc starts the second
step (assigning the transfer target) in which it sends IDE(Rn)
encrypted to BSRn . In turn, BSRn decrypts the received
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message and checks whether Rn is under its authority. If the
verification succeeds, BSRn sends a message that confirms the
successful verification to BSRc . Otherwise, it transmits a mes-
sage that indicates the verification failure. If BSRc receives
a failure message, it aborts the protocol. Other than that,
BSRc encrypts IDE(Rn), IDE(T ) and KBSRc ,T and transmits
the result to BSRn to indicate that Rn is assigned as the new
owner for T . Next, BSRn changes T ’s identity to a new value
(i.e. (IDE(T ))new) and registers Rn as the new owner.
The protocol goes into the last step (generating new shared
keys for Rn). Rn transmits an FOT to T which in turn responds
by transmitting its information encrypted to Rn. Next Rn
encrypts the received message and sends the result to BSRn .
Upon receiving the message, BSRn decrypts it to extract
(IDE(T ))new and then employs the identifier to identify and
authenticate T and to confirm that Rn is the registered owner
for T . If the validation succeeds, BSRn generates two new
keys and then sends them in an encrypted form to T through
Rn. Next, T checks the integrity of the received message and,
if found valid, it updates its keys to the received values. After
T updates its secrets, the OT process is completed.
TABLE 7. Main themes for non-EPC-compliant two-party single OT
protocols.
Table 7 lists the main themes for the non-EPC-compliant
Two-party single OT protocols.
We see that approximately half of the protocols do not
achieve at least one of the following properties: old owner
privacy, new owner privacy, and resistance of the windowing
problem. In addition, there is one protocol that offers OD,
one that offers AR, and five that offer both. These five
protocols are the only ones that provides both OD and AR
in the reviewed literature for all different categories of OT
protocols. As for supportingmobile readers and exclusiveOT,
only three protocols fulfill the former and one achieve the
latter (which is the protocol proposed by Ng et al. [93]).
Finally, regarding the resistance of the security attacks,
it can be seen that the majority of the presented protocols
cannot resist at least one of them regardless of the used cryp-
tographic functions which involve hashing, SKC and PKI .
B. TWO-PARTY GROUP OWNERSHIP
TRANSFER PROTOCOLS
We start this section with Kapoor et al.’s ownership sharing
protocol [70]. The proposed protocol is based on the authors’
opinion which states that a protocol without a TTP is not
considered an OT protocol; rather it is an ownership sharing
protocol because the old owners can still access the tags even
after transferring the ownership to the new owners. On the
other hand, the protocol ensures that the new owners do not
know the previous key in order to protect the privacy of the
old owners.
Kapoor et al.’s protocol employs simple bitwise operations,
RNG, hash function, and SKC . It handles the transfer of a
single T from GroupRc to GroupRn (i.e. single-tag multi-
owner). In addition, for each group of owners, it is assumed
that one of the owners takes the responsibility of being a
coordinator. The coordinator is the owner who initiates the
communication and propagates the changes in keys or access
rights to other owners. Thus, in the initialization phase of this
protocol, the communication occurs between the coordinator
of the current owners CRc and the coordinator of the new
owners CRn and in the key change phase it occurs between
CRn and T . Later on, CRc and CRn pass the changes to their
associated group members.
CRc starts the initialization phase of the protocol when
it receives the OT request FOT . Thus, CRc transmits
EKCRc,T (NCRc ⊕ KCRc,T ) to T and, at the same time, sends
NCRc⊕KCRc,T to CRn over a secure channel. Once T receives
the message, it generates a fresh (N1)T , uses it to encrypt
KCRc,T and then sends the encrypted key to CRn. After per-
forming this step, T and CRn knows the value M1 which
is equal to NCRc ⊕ (N1)T . On the other hand, CRn is not
permitted to know KCRc,T in order to maintain the privacy
of GroupRc .
After that, T starts the key change phase by generating a
fresh (N2)T and then it flips one bit inM1 randomly to getM2.
After that, it transmits (N2)T along with EM2⊕ (N2)T (M2 ⊕
(N2)T ) and HM2⊕ (N2)T (M2 ⊕ (N2)T ) to CRn. Since CRn
knows M1, it obtains M2 from it by using a brute force
technique. After that,CRn employsM2 to decrypt the received
EM2⊕ (N2)T (M2⊕ (N2)T ). Next, it uses the received hash value
to validate the decryption result. Upon successful verifica-
tion,CRn generates a new keyKCRn and transmits it to T in an
encrypted form. T in turn acknowledges the reception of the
new key by sending HKCRn (M2 ⊕ KCRn ). Finally, CRn replies
with EKCRn (M2 ⊕ KCRn ) as an acknowledgment.
Also, it is worth to be mentioned that Kapoor and Pira-
muthu [18] proposed a single OT version of this protocol in
which the ownership of T is transferred from a single Rc to a
single Rn.
The second protocol is the secure multiple group owner-
ship transfer protocol for mobile RFID (SMGOTP) which
was proposed by Yang in [97]. SMGOTP transfers the own-
ership of a group of tags across different authorities in a
mobile RFID environment (i.e. handles the multi-tag single-
owner OT). The main operations used in the protocol are
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simple bitwise operations, RNG, hash function, LE , and
SKC . In fact, SMGOTP follows a structure similar to LOTP
which was previously discussed in Section III-A2. The pro-
posed protocol is divided into three steps. In step 1, GroupT
is authenticated by BSRc . After that, BSRc transmits the
GroupT ’s key to BSRn . In step 3, BSRn updates GroupT ’s key
and another two secret keys.
The main advantage of the protocol is that it can perform
group OT and support mobile environments. In addition,
it guarantees the old and new owner privacies and the loca-
tion privacy and can resists several attacks such as MitM,
de-synchronization, and replay. On the other hand, SMGOTP
is based on many unrealistic assumptions such as ’’tags must
be responsive to all the transmission all the time during
transfer’’. Moreover, there is a step in which Rc needs to
delete the keys. However, there is no guarantee that this would
be done and an old owner with malicious intents may cause
problems.
As for the third protocol, it was proposed by Li et al. [98]
and handles the single-tag multi-owner transfer. The pro-
posed protocol employs simple bitwise operations, RNG,
hash functions, PKC , and BLS signature [99]. The size of the
secret keys held by the tag is fixed regardless of the number
of owners.
In the proposed protocol, it is assumed that each Rc has
a partial ownership of T . Thus, in order to fully transfer T ’s
ownership toGroupRn , all owners inGroupRc need to approve
the transfer process. Moreover, the owners in GroupRc share
a long-term authentication key which allows each owner to
generate temporary keys, prove its partial ownership, and
authenticate T . As for GroupRn , each one challenges all
owners in GroupRc in order to obtain T ’s ownership proof
and request the full OT. Once T ’s ownership is transferred
successfully, Rn can update the long-term authentication key.
The protocol is demonstrated in case GroupRc wishes to
transfer the ownership of a single T to single Rn. Rci starts
the OT process by leading T to use a temporary key which
will be used for a single authentication session. After that,
Rn challenges Rci with a random number, Rci in turn replies
with its signature (which resembles the partial ownership
proof). In order to generate a full ownership proof of T , each
individual Rc needs to generate its partial ownership proof.
Rn checks whether the received signature is valid or not in
order to verify the proof of the partial ownership of T . If the
signature is verified, it tries to authenticate T before accepting
the partial ownership proof.
If Rn needs to verify the full ownership proof, it needs
to validate the partial ownership proofs of all owners in
GroupRc . If all proofs are verified, Rn accepts the full own-
ership proof. In order to transfer the full ownership of T to
Rn, all owners in GroupRc interact in turn with T to update its
long-term authentication key. It is assumed that each Rc inter-
acts with T securely (i.e.; the other owners cannot eavesdrop
on the communication between the two parties). Afterwards,
each Rc sends the new T ’s keys securely to Rn.
Note that each Rc keeps the old and new keys in order
to allow an owner to communicate with T in case the
other owners refused the update of the key and to resist
de-synchronization attacks.
Also, since the record for the ownership (which is sent from
each Rc to Rn) does not contain the private key of the owner,
it can use the public/private pair with all its tags.
Finally, if any owner refuses the ownership request, it will
be canceled. Also, it is not required for all owners to trans-
fer the ownership simultaneously and they can perform the
transfer sequentially.
TABLE 8. Main themes of two-party group OT protocols.
Table 8 provides the main themes of the Two-party group
OT protocols.
In Section IV-B, we discussed the Two-party group OT
protocols. As mentioned previously, these protocols are non-
EPC-compliant. In the reviewed literature, we did not find any
EPC-compliant Two-party group OT protocols. This empha-
sizes the need to design protocols that fall under this category.
Three Two-party group OT protocols were presented and
it can be seen that all three protocols protect the privacy
of the old owner. Yang’s protocol [97] does not achieve the
new owner privacy and the resistance against the windowing
problem. From another point of view, Yang’s protocol is the
only one that can support mobile readers. In addition, all three
protocols do not offer OD, AR, or exclusive OT.
To the best of our knowledge, all three protocols are secure
against the attacks.
V. UNIVERSAL OWNERSHIP TRANSFER PROTOCOLS
Some of the proposed OT protocols are designed to cover all
possible transfer situations (i.e. single-tag to single-owner,
single-tag to multi-owner, multi-tag to single-owner, multi-
tag to multi-owner). These protocols are called universal as
they can be used for any type of transfer.
Throughout the literature, only two protocols (proposed
in [100] and [101]) can be considered as universal. Both pro-
tocols are based on the Two-party model. The work in [101]
is an EPC-compliant protocol while [100] is not.
The work of Ray et al. [100] is considered an example
on the universal OT protocols as it covers all OT scenarios.
The OT scenarios in Ray et al.’s protocol cover the different
transfer situations that result in the business cases. The main
operations used in this protocol are simple bitwise operations,
PRF , hash function, and PKC . As for the validation of the
ownership request and the authentication of the participating
entities, they are performed by the modified Diffie-Hellman
algorithm [102].
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The proposed protocol supports mobile RFID systems
and consists of three stages. In stage 1, the OT is initiated
through the first five steps (step 1 to step 5) of the protocol.
Stage 2 consists of two steps (step 6 and step 7) in which the
mutual authentication and validation is carried out. The OT
is finalized and closed in Stage 3 which is performed through
steps 8 to 14 of the protocol.
A last note on this protocol is that only the public keys
are transmitted between entities. Therefore, even if the adver-
saries intercept the remote communications between entities,
they cannot breach the old and new owner privacies and
cannot violate the location privacy. In addition, the proposed
protocol can resist the replay, de-synchronization, and MitM
attacks.
Another universal OT protocol for the Internet of
Things (IoT) systems was also proposed by Ray et al.
in [101]. The protocol handles the OT in a mobile Networked
RFID System (NRS). In addition to the proposed OT pro-
tocol, the authors proposed a test protocol to confirm that
T ’s ownership was transferred successfully and that T is
exclusively owned by Rn. The proposed protocols are based
on number theory, the transitivity property, and the multi-
plicative inverse of modular arithmetic. As for the operations,
it employs simple bitwise operations, arithmetic operations,
CRC , PRF , and Hash Function. The tags in this protocol are
assumed to be able to perform basic arithmetic operations and
32-bit CRC .
The object identification model in the IoT is represented
by a global pool of objects controlled by several adminis-
trative business entities known as NRS. There are four main
components in an NRS: the BS, the current and new owners,
the coordinator owners, and the tags.
The owners and coordinator owner can access the owned
tags in GroupT by using the group’s private key which is
known to them. Furthermore, the communication between
GroupRc and GroupRn is performed through the coordinator
owners which represents each group. The communication
between two coordinator owners is performed via a secure
channel using the secure wireless communication protocol
proposed in [103]. In addition to providing a secure channel,
the employed wireless communication protocol allows the
parties to authenticate each other. Nevertheless, this does not
guarantee that Rn has the right to own a new set of tags.
In the proposed protocol, the ownership of GroupT is to
be transferred from one NRS represented by GroupRc to
another one resembled by GroupRn . The owners (GroupRc
and GroupRn ) belong to different administrative domains
and before starting the OT protocol, they exchange a token
code (TC) value through a secure channel. The purpose of
exchanging TC is to formalize the ownership agreement to
this OT between the owners (i.e. ensuring that the parties
of the OT have agreed on the required monetary, legal and
contractual procedures).
Ray et al.’s OT protocol can be carried out through two
stages; the ownership rights and transferring request valida-
tion and the OT and ownership claim process. After the OT
is completed, Rn initiates the test protocol to confirm that the
ownership was transferred successfully.
BSRn starts the first stage of the protocol by transmitting
SKGroupRn , the list of readers that have SKGroupRn (RGroupRn ),
an encryption of TC, and NBSRn to CRRn . Once CRRn
receives the information, it requests an OT by transmitting
the encrypted TC to CRRc . In turn, CRRc polls to all owners
in GroupRc in order to collect their status and confirms that
they are active and authentic. Next, it sends PKGroupRc and
(K1)CRRc to CRRn in order to ask for the verification infor-
mation that can be employed in the validation of the OT
request and the ownership right process. It is worth to bemen-
tioned that PKGroupRc is computed using the modified group
Diffie-Hellman equation [102].
After that, CRRn utilizes the received information along
with its secrets to compute PKGroupRn . Moreover, it computes
the verification key (K2)CRRc by using the Diffie-Hellman key
generation equation [102]. Finally, CRRn encrypts (K2)CRRc
by usingNBSRn and then sends the result along with PKGroupRn
to CRRc in order to verify its OT request and claim of owner-
ship right. When CRRc receives the verification information,
it verifies whether the received (K2)CRRc and NBSRn are valid.
If (K2)CRRc is valid, CRRc verifies the OT request and if NBSRn
is verified, it validates the ownership right over the tagged
objects.
After verifying the request and ownership right, CRRc
replies by transmitting the stored tags’ tokens and associ-
ated information (excluding IDT ), the total number of tags
that will be transferred, the maximum time delay for a suc-
cessful protocol execution, CRC(SKGroupRc ) and CRC(IDT ).
Once CRRn receives the information, it employs the received
tags’ tokens (TT) to compute a TC value and then com-
pares the result with the stored TC. If both values match,
CRRn verifies that it has received the correct tag set. On the
other hand, CRRn is still unable to read T because it does
not have its IDT . Therefore, CRRn generates a new T ’s ID
(i.e. (IDT )new) and for each T that will be owned it computes
new TT (i.e. (TTCRRn )
new). Finally, CRRn computes a new TC
(i.e. (TCCRRn )
new) by using the generated (TTCRRn )
new and
then transmits it along with the unique ID of the new owners’
NRS to CRRc . By that the first stage is completed.
When CRRc receives (TCCRRn )
new and the ID of NRS,
it starts the second stage of the protocol by performing
the mutual authentication protocols demonstrated in [104]
and [105] with all tags in GroupT to ensure that there are
no fraud owners or tags. After that, it calculates new TTs
(i.e. (TTCRRc )
new). Moreover, CRRc employs the received
NRS’s ID to retrieve the limit of the new owners. Next,
it starts the OT by transmitting the retrieved limit, the session
time (ts) and (TTCRRc )
new encrypted along with the state
value (which is set to 1 to indicate OT) to the tags that are
involved in the OT.
Upon receiving the information, each involved T verifies
its legitimacy and if found valid, it authenticates the OT
request, changes its state to ’1’, and determines the correct
limit value for Rn. After that, T sends its IDT in an encrypted
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form along with its state value to CRRn in order to inform it
about the change in OT status.
Once CRRn receives T ’s response, it tries to validate it.
If the received response is verified, CRRn confirms that it
originated from one of its transferring tags. Next, it transmits
(TTCRRn )
new, TC and another two secrets in an encrypted form
to T in order to claim the ownership. It should be mentioned
that (TTCRRn )
new and TC are employed to verify the genuine-
ness of the ownership claim, whereas the other two secrets
are used to perform a test suite to claim exclusive ownership.
T in turn verifies the received values and if found authentic,
it confirms that the ownership claim of CRRn is valid and then
initiates the test protocol to ensure the exclusive ownership
to it.
After the test protocol is completed successfully, CRRn
sends an acknowledgment to T . At last, when T receives
the acknowledgment, it checks its integrity and if verified, T
updates its secrets to (IDT )new and CRC( SKGroupRn ), changes
its state to ’0’, and finally deletes all temporary values from
its memory. By this, the OT protocol is finished.
TABLE 9. Main themes for universal OT protocols.
Themain themes of the universal OT protocols is displayed
in the Table 9.
Only two universal OT protocols were reviewed and dis-
cussed in this section. Both protocols guarantee the old and
new owner privacies and can resist the windowing problem.
Regarding the exclusive OT and supporting mobile read-
ers, the protocol in [101] offers both, whereas the protocol
in [100] provides only the latter. Neither of the protocols
provides OD or AR.
On a final note, based on the reviewed literature, both pro-
tocols can resist the security attacks which are summarized
in Section II-A.
VI. OWNERSHIP DELEGATION
As mentioned in Section II-A, OD is a special case of OT
in which the ownership of the tag is transferred temporarily
from the current owner to another owner (called delegate).
The delegate can access the tag for a predetermined number
of times or until the current owner terminates the delegation.
Moreover, as mentioned in Section II-A, if the delegate that
needs to access the tag was an old owner of it, the process of
temporarily transferring the tag’s ownership is called autho-
rization AR.
In order to clarify the idea of OD and AR we demonstrate
in this section the OD and AR protocol which was proposed
by Dimitriou in [89].
In Dimitriou’s protocol, T stores a DELEGATEDbit which
is set to 1 in OD and AR mode and 0 otherwise. Moreover,
T stores a counter (Cnt) in order to limit the number of
allowable delegations (i.e. controlled delegation). In addition
to OD, Dimitriou’s protocol can be used to perform AR.
The OD protocol is executed through the following steps
• Rc generates a random nonce (N1)Rc and sends it along
with a Delegate command and the maximum number of
permitted delegations (Cntmax) to T .
• T responds by generating a random nonce NT and com-
puting HKRc,T (NT , (N1)Rc ,Cntmax) and then it transmits
them to Rc.
• Rc then employs the received message to verify the
T ’s legitimacy. If the verification succeeds, it gen-
erates another random nonce (N2)Rc and computes
HKRc,T ((N2)Rc , (N1)Rc ,Cntmax). Finally, Rc transmits
(N2)Rc and HKRc,T ((N2)Rc , (N1)Rc ,Cntmax) to T .
• T in turn uses the received messages to authenti-
cate Rc and the delegation command. If Rc passes
the verification, T calculates the delegation key KD as
KD = HKRc,T ((N2)Rc , (N1)Rc ,NT ,Cntmax , ‘‘Delegate′′),
sets the DELEGATED bit to 1, and initializes the stored
Cnt value to Cntmax .
• Rc also computesKD and forwards it to the delegate (Rd )
through a secure channel. Therefore, the delegate now
can query T .
Each time the delegate queries T , Cnt value is decre-
mented by 1. When Cnt becomes 0, T sets the
DELEGATED bit to 0 and destroys KD. Therefore,
the delegation is terminated and again T can only be
accessed by Rc.
It should be mentioned that some other protocols start with
a Cnt value of 0 and increment it each time T is queried.
In these protocols, the delegation is terminated when Cnt
value exceeds Cntmax .
In Dimitriou’s protocol, Rc can terminate the delegation -
before Cnt expires- automatically by two methods. The first
one is through updating T ’s key, whereas the second method
is to issue a direct Cancel Delegation command. When this
command is received by T and if Rc is verified, T terminates
the delegation by setting the DELEGATED bit to 0 and
destroying KD.
As for AR, it is performed by the same OD protocol when
Ro needs to query T only. On the other hand, if Ro requires
performing more functions on T , the ownership needs to be
transferred to it completely.
However, Lee et al. [90] stated that because Dimitriou’s
protocol does not achieve full mutual authentication between
the participating entities, the delegation key may be disclosed
by Adv.
Other OD protocols that follow a procedure similar to
Dimitriou’s protocol were also proposed in [10], [13], [44],
[45], [50], [83], [84], [88], and [93].
A last note on the OD is that in some works the delegation
is not controlled (i.e. the number of times that the delegate
can query T is not limited). In these works, the delegation
can be terminated by Rc only. Examples on this approach are
the protocols proposed in [80] and [37].
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To further clarify the idea of uncontrolled delegation we
briefly explains Niu et al.’s OD protocol [37]. In this protocol,
the OD process is started with the computation of a secret
value, called Ticket, which encrypts the master key (which is
shared between Rc and T) and IDT . The Ticket is computed
by Rc and T . After that, the delegate obtains the Ticket from
Rc via a secure channel. The purpose of the Ticket is to prove
that the delegate is legitimate and has the required credentials
to access T . Thus, once the delegate obtains the Ticket, it can
query T and update its secret (i.e. KT ) through the proposed
mutual authentication protocol. For this protocol, there is
no counter and the delegate can query T without limitation.
Therefore, to terminate the delegation, all Rc needs to do is
change the value of the master key so that the Ticket value at
the delegate’s side will differ from its counterpart at T ’s side.
Thus, the delegate can no longer be authenticated by T .
Some works propose methods to achieve either OD or AR
and some provide both.
VII. COMPARISONS
Table 10 and Table 11 provide a comparison of the discussed
protocols based on the properties and security vulnerabili-
ties (attacks); respectively.
The notation used in Table 10 indicates the following:
3 The protocol satisfies the property.
∗ The protocol satisfies the property under an assumption.
5 The protocol does not satisfy the property.
As for Table 11, the notation points out the following:
3 The protocol can resist the attack.
∗ : The protocol can resist the attack under an assumption.
5: The protocol cannot resist the attack.
Note that we did not add the forward and backward trace-
ability attacks to Table 11 because our interest in this survey
is their impact on the old and new owner privacies which are
presented in the Table 10.
VIII. DISCUSSION
With the abundance of previous work in this field, it is quite
essential to use a unified terminology. For example, the pre-
sentation of the term old owner privacy varies between back-
ward untraceability, forward privacy, and backward security.
The same applies to new owner privacy which is normally
substituted by other terms such as forward untraceability,
backward privacy, and forward security. These different terms
may cause confusion to the novice reader. In this paper,
we adopted the terms old owner privacy and the new owner
privacy as they give a direct meaning and are easy to follow
by the readers.
Also, in comparing the protocols in the literature as being
TTP-based or Two-party, we say that approximately there is
the same number in both categories. However, if we compare
them from the single and group OT perspective, it is obvious
that the latter is receiving less attention than the former.
We believe that further work is needed to cover the group OT
as it is more applicable to the practical uses of RFID systems.
Another point of interest is that if the reviewed protocols
in this survey are compared based on the EPC-compliance
perspective, we see that the number of protocols that are EPC-
compliant these that are non-EPC-compliant. There should
be more work towards the EPC-compliant OT protocols,
especially for the group OT. Based on our reviewed literature,
there is only 1 group EPC-compliant protocol vs seven proto-
cols from the other category. In addition, the only group EPC-
compliant protocol falls under the TTP-based OT category,
whereas there is none for the Two-party OT category. This
area is open are for future research. This couples with the
argument that states that EPC-compliance is quite essential
for a protocol to be adopted in the supply chain is almost
half these that are non-EPC-compliant. There should be more
work towards the EPC-compliant OT protocols, especially for
the group OT. Based on our reviewed literature, there is only
1 group EPC-compliant protocol vs seven protocols from the
other category. In addition, the only group EPC-compliant
protocol falls under the TTP-based OT category, whereas
there is none for the Two-party OT category. This area is open
for future research. This couples with the argument which
states that EPC-compliance is quite essential for a protocol
to be adopted in the supply chain
Offering exclusive OT and supporting mobile readers
is quite essential but is not well-addressed. Based on the
reviewed literature, we found that only two papers offer
exclusive OT. As for supporting mobile readers, it can be
seen that the modern RFID applications have included the
use of mobile readers (such as PDAs and mobile phones).
On the other hand, we found that only twelve protocols
from the presented works can support mobile readers with
little support of the required properties/resistance to attacks.
This offers a hot area of research for interested researchers
to work on, especially with the needs of the modern RFID
applications.
Another issue to be addressed is related to the situa-
tions where the owners need to rent their tagged items to
other, or temporarily transfer ownership to entities such as
the TPL provider, or allowing the old owners to access
them. In the first two cases the protocol should offer OD,
whereas in the third it should provide AR. These situa-
tions are common in our lives, however; only thirteen pro-
tocols from the presented works afford either OD or AR
and just five protocols provide both. Addressing the chal-
lenges of such open issues are quite essential for the proper
adoption in RFID systems in scenarios that need these
properties.
Unfortunately, from the provided discussion for the
reviewed protocols, it can be seen that roughly half of them do
not achieve at least one of the following: old owner privacy,
new owner privacy, and resistance to windowing problem.
Furthermore, approximately half of them are susceptible to
at least one of the attacks that have been highlighted in this
survey.
Generally speaking, the vulnerabilities of most of the pre-
sented works are due to one or more of the following:
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TABLE 10. Summary of the properties of the investigated protocols.
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TABLE 11. Summary of the vulnerabilities to attacks for the investigated protocols.
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• The messages sent by the participating entities are
static (i.e. do not contain fresh nonces) which allows for
tracking attacks.
• Transmitting the sensitive information in clear text helps
the adversaries to perform tracking and impersonation
attacks.
• Blocking or modifying the last message sent from the
reader/server to the tag which, in turn, does not send an
acknowledgment allows for de-synchronization attacks.
• Lack of or improper design of mutual authentication
between the participating entities makes it easier for the
adversaries to perform various attacks.
• Misuse of the employed cryptographic functions can
lead to disclosure attacks.
• Not taking into consideration the cases that may arise
if/when a tag has been compromised.
To the best of our knowledge and based on the reviewed lit-
erature, the other half of protocols can presumably guarantee
the old and new owner privacies and resists the windowing
problem and the security attacks. However, these are claims
that were made by the authors and the protocols (especially
the recent ones) did not undergo rigorous evaluation to prove
their security worthiness. Research in this area is needed to
guarantee that an adopted protocol would, in reality, provide
the claimed security properties and strengths.
We conclude this section by offering a set of guidelines to
be considered in the design of new OT protocols. We divide
the guidelines into five layers and each layer should be
built upon those that precede it (i.e; the protocol complexity
increases as we add further layers).
Layer I: This layer presents the minimum requirements
that should exist in anOT protocol. First of all, an OT protocol
should at least achieve three properties, namely the old owner
privacy, new owner privacy, and resistance to the windowing
problem. Fulfilling the first two properties is a must in order
to achieve a genuine and successful transfer that protects the
privacy of both owners. Moreover, it is necessary to ensure
that the protocol resists the windowing problem, otherwise
the result will be a sharing protocol where both owners can
access the tag.
The protocol should offer complete mutual authentication
between the participating entities and take into consideration
the importance of avoiding the reasons for the vulnerabilities
that were summarized above in order to secure the protocol
against the attacks in light of the attacks shown in the survey.
The protocol should adhere to the EPC-standard to be
compatible with the majority of RFID applications which
tend to use low-cost (i.e.; passive tags). Also, the protocol
design should be modular such that it can perform several
operations with the least possible implementation cost.
Deciding whether the protocol should be designed based
on the TTP-based model or the Two-party model depends
on the system in which the protocol is to be used. If the
owners trust a third party to watch over the transfer, the pro-
tocol should be designed based on the TTP-based model.
On the other hand, if the owners prefer to perform the transfer
directly with each other, the protocol should be modeled after
the Two-party model.
An important point to mention regarding this issue
is that the ISE assumption which is followed by the
Two-party model is considered unreasonable. Therefore,
the newly designed protocols that are based on the Two-party
model should perform OT between the owners without rely-
ing on the ISE assumption. Examples on already proposed
protocols that fulfill this concept and discussed in this survey
are in [73], [91], and [95]. From another point of view, these
three protocols are not EPC-compliant since they usePKI and
hashing on the tag’s side. Thus, the real challenge is to design
an EPC-compliant Two-party OT protocol without a need for
an isolated environment.
Layer II: This layer presents the additional properties that
should be offered by the OT protocol. The additional proper-
ties are OD, AR, and exclusive OT. As we argued previously,
the OT protocol should also provide OD and AR in order
to handle the situations where other parties need to access
the tags. Moreover, we believe that the OT protocol should
support the exclusive OT property to confirm to the new
owner that the protocol session has completed successfully
and that it is the sole owner.
Layer III: In our opinion, the newly designed OT proto-
cols need to support mobile readers such that they can be used
with the variety of mobile RFID applications that emerged
recently.
Layer IV: We believe that the OT protocol should also
support group OT in order to transfer the ownership of a
group of tags at once from one owner to another (i.e. multi-
tag single-owner case). This group transfer is necessary for
certain environments such as supply chains systems.
Layer V: The designed OT protocol should afford other
types of group transfer which means that it will be a universal
OT protocol. An example of such a protocol is the work
proposed by Ray et al. in [101]. However, this protocol is
missing one property in that it neither offers OD nor AR.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this survey, we gave a comprehensive and systematic
review of the RFID ownership transfer which is one of the
most important aspects of RFID systems. We started by
introducing RFID systems and their security goals in general
and the RFID ownership transfer and its security goals in
particular. After that, we surveyed the protocols in this field
from the early-start work up to the current state of the art.
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first
comprehensive survey for RFID ownership transfer which
reviews the proposed protocols that appeared over the period
2005-2018. We classified the protocols based on the mainly
used models, namely the TTP-based and Two-party and fur-
ther we categorized the protocols in each model based on the
EPC-standard and the type of transfer (single vs. group).
For each protocol, we presented a brief discussion of its
procedure and vulnerabilities and highlighted its main theme.
In addition, we clarified the idea of OD and AR through
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a general example. After that, we compared all protocols in
terms of the security goals which involve the offered own-
ership transfer properties and security against attacks in a
tabular form.
Finally, we gave our insight regarding the discussed work
in order to identify open issues that needs to be handled in
the future research and we also provide general guidelines
to design an OT protocol that would achieve the required
security goals.
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